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Abstract 
We construct a dynamic takeover law index using hand-collected data on legal 
provisions and empirically examine the effect of takeover regulation to protect 
shareholders on shareholder wealth for bidders and targets in a multi-country setting. 
We find that a stricter takeover law increases combined wealth for bidders and 
targets, which suggests that stronger shareholder protection in the takeover bid 
process increases the efficiency of the takeover market. Contrary to our hypothesis, 
results show that stricter takeover law does not hurt bidders. Its effect on target 
announcement returns and takeover premiums is significantly positive and 
economically large. Our findings suggest that the mandatory bid rule and ownership 
disclosure increase synergistic gains in takeovers, whilst the fair-price rule and 
squeeze-out rights may reduce combined gains. Further results show that increased 
overall gains can be explained by greater competition in the market for corporate 
control and a shorter time to successful completion of a takeover under stricter 
takeover law. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the US and the UK introduced their first national takeover regulation in the 
late 1960s, policymakers and regulators have aimed to provide a takeover law that 
protects shareholders in a takeover bid whilst facilitating the market for corporate 
control and maintaining the integrity of financial markets. The development and 
implementation of the EU takeover directive0F1, which was intended to promote the 
integration of European capital markets and harmonize takeover regulation in Europe, 
has highlighted the ongoing struggle in takeover regulation to find an optimal 
takeover law that addresses the concerns of member states and provides for an 
efficient market for corporate control (Enriques et al., 2014; Humperhy-Jenner, 2012; 
Clerc et al., 2012). In this paper, we explore the convergence of takeover regulation 
in Europe towards greater protection of minority shareholders and test whether it has 
improved the efficiency of takeovers or has increased the potential for value 
destruction through greater deal complexity or entrenched managers and possibly 
shifted the allocation of wealth generation from bidder shareholders to increasingly 
protected target shareholders. We further investigate which of the main takeover law 
provisions contribute to these effects. 
 
The optimality of takeover regulations has been explored from a theoretical 
perspective as well as through empirical studies using broad shareholder protection 
indices or time fixed effects. Taking a theoretical approach, Bergström and Högfeldt 
(1997) model the impact of individual takeover regulations, such as the mandatory 
bid rule and the equal bid rule, on the efficiency of capital markets. Martynova and 
Renneboog (2011a) and Goergen et al. (2005) document how in the period 1990–
2005 countries across Europe have caught up with the UK towards the Anglo-
American system of corporate governance when improving the legal position of 
shareholders. In their empirical examination of cross-border takeovers in the period 
1993–2001, Martynova and Renneboog (2008b) find some evidence of a positive 
effect of shareholder protection on targets and an insignificant one on bidders. They 
obtain these results from broad indices of shareholder rights (e.g., appointment 
rights, decision rights, transparency) and minority shareholder protection (voting and 
other decision rights, trusteeship rights and rights in the event of a takeover). By 
contrast, Humphery-Jenner (2012) focuses specifically on takeover regulation and 
finds a negative effect on bidder returns when using a more recent sample to estimate 
the impact of the EU takeover directive. He attributes this to increased managerial 
entrenchment in bidders and greater legal uncertainty created by the directive.  
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To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies that try to assess the effects of 
takeover law on total shareholder wealth in targets and bidders combined as well as 
separately, estimate the impact of individual legal provisions or control for time and 
country heterogeneity. The aim of this paper is to fill these gaps by empirically 
evaluating the efficiency of takeover regulation as a whole and the effects of 
individual provisions governing takeover bids on the distribution of wealth in 
takeovers. The heterogeneous capital markets in Europe provide an opportunity to 
explore the effects of takeover regulation in a set of countries over time and during 
a critical phase of the development of their capital markets. The available sample of 
takeovers spans the most active period of legal developments in takeover regulation 
and covers all critical sub-periods over the past few decades. Specifically, we aim to 
answer the following questions by identifying whether takeover regulation creates or 
reduces shareholder wealth: (1) Does stricter takeover law reduce the combined 
synergistic gains to shareholders involved in takeovers? (2) Does stricter takeover 
law hurt bidding firms and lead to wealth losses for bidders? (3) Does stricter 
takeover law protect minority shareholders and generate a higher return for target 
shareholders? (4) Which legal provisions matter most in explaining the variation of 
takeover gains to targets and bidders? 
 
To answer these questions, we construct a dynamic takeover law index using hand-
collected data on legal provisions that reflect the evolution and quality of takeover 
laws in EU economies over the period 1986–2010. The index, which focuses on key 
takeover law provisions that affect the process and the (re-)distribution of wealth in 
takeovers, includes six provisions: ownership disclosure, mandatory bid, fair price 
for the minority shareholders, squeeze-out rights, sell-out rights, and management 
neutrality. A higher index score represents a more stringent takeover regulation in a 
given country, in other words, a market for corporate control more favorable to target 
shareholders. This is the first study to create a comprehensive and dynamic takeover 
law index, which enables a straightforward comparison and analysis between 
countries in terms of their market regulations for corporate control transfers. To 
measure wealth effects, we use announcement returns as a proxy for expected wealth 
generation and wealth transfer in takeovers and compare them to takeover premiums 
as a measure of the bidder’s willingness to pay.  
 
Results show that stricter takeover regulation increases the total wealth for the 
combined companies. Combined announcement returns for bidders and targets 
increase by 4.5 percentage points when transitioning from weak shareholder 
protection to a high-protection environment. This indicates an improved efficiency 
in mergers and acquisitions under a stricter takeover law. Our empirical investigation 
of which takeover law provisions matter most for this wealth effect shows that the 
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ownership disclosure rule and the mandatory bid rule are of crucial importance in 
achieving higher combined announcement returns. To further explore the total 
wealth effects of takeover law, we exclude UK targets from the analyses. The 
evidence suggests a statistically positive and economically stronger effect of our 
takeover law index, the ownership disclosure rule and the mandatory bid rule on the 
combined announcement returns for non-UK targets. Interestingly, the fair price rule 
and the squeeze-out rights rule tend to reduce the total wealth of the combined 
companies when we exclude UK targets. 
 
We find that a stricter takeover regulation does not hurt bidders but balances the 
trade-off between bidders and targets. Results show that a stricter takeover law does 
not reduce bidders’ returns where previous research that did not control for time 
heterogeneity finds a detrimental effect on acquirers’ performance when studying the 
EU takeover directive (Humphery-Jenner, 2012). Stringent takeover regulation 
provides better protection for minority shareholders of target firms in a takeover bid. 
Changing takeover regulation from the weakest to the strongest, ceteris paribus, is 
associated with a 25 percent higher announcement return for target shareholders and 
a 44 percentage points increase in the takeover premium. This impact is primarily 
driven by the ownership disclosure rule and the mandatory bid rule. Contrary to our 
expectation, the evidence does not support the view that these positive gains for 
target shareholders come at the expense of bidders. Announcement returns to bidders 
are not significantly lower under a stricter takeover law. Furthermore, a mediation 
test that considers alternative paths from stricter takeover law to higher 
announcement returns suggests that a stricter takeover law may even directly 
increase announcement returns for bidders. 
 
To further investigate the sources of efficiency gains in the takeover process, we 
examine the likelihood of competing offers being launched, toeholds, and time to 
completion. Our empirical findings suggest that strict takeover law to protect 
shareholders reduces legal uncertainty and generally improves the efficiency of the 
takeover process. We find that ownership disclosure encourages competition in the 
takeover market, but bidders take precautions by increasing the toehold before 
attempting to acquire a target. The mandatory bid rule reduces the time to successful 
completion of a deal. Interestingly, the management neutrality rule significantly 
shortens the time to completion.  
 
Our paper contributes to the literature by constructing a dynamic takeover law index 
and testing the effects of takeover regulation as a whole and individual provisions 
governing the takeover process. Most importantly, the multi-country structure of our 
original takeover law index measures the convergence of takeover regulation in 
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Europe and allows us for the first time to control for unobserved heterogeneity in 
both country and time dimensions. By exploiting differences in takeover regulation 
across countries and through time, we examine the effects of takeover law where 
previous studies were not able to control for country effects due to a lack of a time 
variation in their legal variables of interest (Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Rossi and Volpin, 
2004; Nenova, 2003).  
 
The findings presented in this paper have implications for a range of previous studies. 
Our paper is most closely related to work by Humphery-Jenner (2012), Martynova 
and Renneboog (2011a, 2008b), Bris and Cabolis (2008), Rossi and Volpin (2004) 
and Nenova (2003). In contrast to Humphery-Jenner (2012), who uses the EU 
directive as a natural experiment, our results show that there is no evidence of a 
negative effect of takeover regulation on bidder announcement returns despite our 
research design including more legislative changes. Focusing on the international 
convergence of corporate governance and cross-border transactions, Martynova and 
Renneboog’s (2011a, 2008b) minority shareholder protection index includes some 
of the provisions we use in this paper. We contribute to this line of research by 
providing empirical evidence that takeover law as measured by our index matters 
more to shareholder wealth in a takeover bid than a broad corporate governance index, 
by estimating combined wealth effects and by answering the question which 
individual provisions matter most in takeover regulation. Our study also goes beyond 
the results provided by Bris and Cabolis (2008), Rossi and Volpin (2004) and Nenova 
(2003). We construct a dynamic and focused takeover law index (rather than using a 
static index or the broad cross-sectional index by La Porta et al. (1998)), examine 
individual provisions, and estimate their effects on combined-firm announcement 
returns. Our closer examination of the combined wealth effects is particularly 
important because takeovers may redistribute rather than create value (McCahery et 
al., 2004; Burkart, 1999). Combined with an estimation of the sources of efficiency 
gains in the takeover process, our analyses offer insights into the redistributive 
effects of takeovers and the implications and impact of takeover regulation in 
practice.  
 
Our study further contributes to the literature by examining takeover regulation 
outside the United States and has practical implications for takeover policy in non-
EU countries, in particular for country-level rules on ownership disclosure and 
mandatory bids. While US antitakeover law is mainly concerned with hostile 
takeovers (e.g., takeover defenses)1F2, European takeover regulation emphasizes the 
protection of minority shareholders (e.g., through the mandatory bid rule, see 
Magnuson, 2009). Although we use heterogeneity among countries in Europe to 
identify the effect of takeover law provisions, our findings provide insights into 
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similar provisions in the US. For example, the Williams Act in the US requires the 
disclosure of a bidder’s identity and the extent of the bidder’s holdings in the target, 
among other things, once the bidder obtains more than a specified percentage of 
shares. Since this is a regulation at the federal level, any effect of the Williams Act 
would be difficult to distinguish from unobserved time effects. Our study of 
European disclosure rules adds a country dimension, which enables us to isolate the 
effect of disclosure requirements from unobserved country and time effects. While 
the US does not have a mandatory bid rule, "control share cash-out" provisions at the 
state level require the bidder to purchase the minority shareholders’ shares at a fair 
price if a bidder gains voting power of a certain percentage of a company, which is 
similar to the sell-out rule studied in this paper. Another type of statutes related to 
this paper are “fair price” statutes, which require takeovers to be approved by a 
supermajority of shareholders unless a “best price” offered by the bidder is paid to 
all of them. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our main 
hypotheses. Section 4 outlines the construction of the takeover law index and 
discusses the evolution of takeover law in the EU. Section 3 introduces our sample 
and identification strategy. Section 4 presents the empirical results on synergistic 
gains to bidders and targets and explores the sources of such gains in the takeover 
process. Robustness analyses are reported in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
Takeover regulation has attracted the attention of policymakers, managers, investors 
and academics alike since the early 1980s (e.g., Souther, 2015; Straska and Waller, 
2014; Cuñat et al., 2012; Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008a; 
Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Nenova, 2003; DeAngelo and Rice, 1983; Grossman and 
Hart, 1980). Takeover law regulates the market for corporate control and – because 
of the potential of takeovers to generate synergistic gains and redistribute wealth in 
society – it defines the rights and obligations of the acquiring and target firm such as 
the requirements of information disclosure, the orderly process of the offer, the terms 
of the bid, and the defensive measures available to target managers. 
 
The aim of an appropriate takeover law is to design an optimal set of rules that 
balances the trade-off between promoting an efficient market for corporate control 
and protecting the minority shareholders in a takeover bid from being taken 
advantage of by bidders, majority shareholders or their own management (McCahery 
et al., 2004; Berglöf and Burkart, 2003). Strict takeover law to protect shareholders 
may lead to overall efficiency losses due to higher transaction costs (e.g., more legal 
barriers) or result in greater agency costs and overbidding because of the increased 
competition among bidders. On the other hand, shareholder protection may be a zero-
sum game in which increased protection benefits target shareholders at the expense 
of bidders, transferring gains from bidders to targets and leaving total synergies 
unchanged, or increase overall gains from improved deal execution with efficient 
takeover regulation.  
 
Prior theoretical and empirical work has focused heavily on the mandatory bid rule 
as the key provision in takeover law (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Burkart and Panunzi, 
2003; Nenova, 2003; Bebchuk, 1994), while others study the impact of ownership 
disclosure, squeeze-out rights, sell-out rights, and management neutrality in takeover 
regulation (Armour et al., 2007; Bebchuk, 2002; Burkart, 1999; Yarrow, 1985). 
Recognizing the importance of these provisions, European policymakers aimed to 
harmonize the European takeover market by including them in the EU Directive 
2004/25/EC on takeovers. In the following sections, we review the prior literature on 
these key provisions and develop hypotheses on the impact of takeover law and 
relevant provisions on shareholder wealth and the distribution of synergistic gains in 
takeovers. 
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2.1 Shareholder protection in takeovers 
 
An objective of takeover regulation is to protect minority shareholder interests in the 
event of an attempted takeover. While a strict takeover law that is strongly in favor 
of target shareholder can increase takeover barriers for bidders, an insufficient 
shareholder protection might impose losses on minority shareholder in a takeover 
bid. Therefore, rational investors will demand a larger discount when they invest in 
a legal system that offers lower takeover protection or will abandon the stock market 
as a whole (Burkart, 1999).  
 
Strict takeover law provides more opportunities for minority shareholders to 
participate in a takeover process. Among the key provisions in takeover law, 
ownership disclosure requires an early disclosure of the toehold that potential buyers 
have acquired in target firms. Where a lax disclosure standard allocates more 
takeover gains to bidders through pre-takeover shareholdings, it comes at the expense 
of target shareholders. A strict disclosure requirement improves the bargaining 
power of shareholders and managers in target firms at the early stage of a takeover 
because, with the relevant information, they can evaluate the bid properly and time 
the bid to extract a higher premium (Schouten and Siems, 2010; Armour et al., 2007). 
Better information disclosure is also likely to increase the competitions among 
potential bidders and generate higher takeover premiums paid to target shareholders.  
 
Equal opportunities for all investors and the fair treatment of minority shareholders 
are the most important elements for any takeover law (Goergen et al., 2005). As a 
key component of a takeover law that offers minority shareholders a greater chance 
to participate in the takeover process, the mandatory bid rule requires a bidder to 
make a tender offer to all outstanding shares once the direct or indirect holdings cross 
a certain threshold of voting rights, which is typically set at 30%. This rule protects 
minority shareholders by providing them with an opportunity to exit the company, 
especially when combined with a fair price rule, which normally requires acquirers 
to pay an average historical share price (Ferrarini and Miller, 2010; Goergen et al., 
2005; Berglöf and Burkart, 2003; Burkart and Panunzi, 2003; Skog, 1997; Bergström 
and Högfeldt, 1997; Bebchuk, 1994). A stringent mandatory bid rule thus offers 
minority shareholders better protection by forcing majority shareholders to share 
takeover gains with minority shareholders. 
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The squeeze-out rights rule grants bidders the right to purchase the remaining shares 
after they exceed a certain ownership level. This rule can be used to control the free-
rider problem by bidders, thereby making value-increasing takeovers feasible 
(Yarrow, 1985). The counterpart of the squeeze-out rights rule is the sell-out rights 
rule, which offers minority shareholders the right to require the majority owner to 
buy them out at a certain level of shareholdings. Sell-out rights protect minority 
shareholders and effectively eliminate the pressure-to-tender problem, shift the 
bargaining power from the bidder to target shareholders and thus prevent all value-
decreasing takeovers (Goergen et al., 2005; McCahery et al., 2004; Burkart and 
Panunzi, 2003; Grossman and Hart, 1980).  
 
2.2 Efficiency gains and losses due to takeover law 
 
Takeover law can affect how synergistic gains generated by takeovers accrue to 
bidders and targets in different ways. While takeover law is designed to ensure an 
orderly takeover process, it may reduce the overall synergistic gains in takeovers by 
protecting shareholders and entrenching the target’s managers. The synergistic gains, 
achieved through increased operational efficiency, combined technology or greater 
market power, will be reflected in the change in the combined shareholder wealth of 
acquirers and targets. These gains may be reduced further by uncertainty in the legal 
framework or increased compliance costs under more complex regulation. 
 
Strict takeover law can increase legal barriers and reduce bidder returns by making 
takeovers more expensive. For example, a stringent ownership disclosure standard 
increases chances of competing acquirers launching a bid. This potential competition 
may lead to overbidding in a takeover contest (Burkart, 1999, 1995; Bebchuk, 1982). 
While a lower ownership disclosure threshold benefits target shareholders, it limits 
the bidder’s profits, as the initial stake in a target firm is the primary source of profits 
for the bidder (Burkart, 1999). This may curb the incentive to launch a takeover bid 
and reduce the frequency of value-enhancing takeovers (Zingales, 2004; La Porta et 
al., 2000; Burkart, 1995). 
 
Despite its positive effects for minority shareholders, the mandatory bid rule may 
reduce the efficiency of the market for corporate control, for example by hampering 
bidders’ ability to freely purchase shares because investors can tender their shares to 
bidders at the increased share price (De La Bruslerie, 2013). It may increase the costs 
of takeovers and act as an anti-takeover device (Enriques, 2004) because it prevents 
bidders from using coercive bid structures, such as partial bids and two-tier bids. 
Other scholars argue that the mandatory bid rule eliminates inefficient control 
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transfers at the cost of discouraging more efficient control transfers (Enriques et al., 
2014; Clerc et al., 2012; Goergen et al., 2005; Berglöf and Burkart, 2003; Burkart 
and Panunzi, 2003; Bergström and Högfeldt, 1997; Bergström, Högfeldt, and Molin, 
1997; Bebchuk, 1994). A strict mandatory bid rule – especially in combination with 
a fair price rule – might benefit entrenched managers by discouraging value-creating 
bids and reducing economic value (Humphery-Jenner, 2012; Burkart and Panunzi, 
2004).  
 
Strict takeover law may directly or indirectly increase transaction costs and agency 
cost because of increasing complexity in the takeover regulation framework. 
Humphery-Jenner (2012) argues that the EU directive makes takeovers more difficult 
and time consuming to acquire targets. Therefore, the directive may entrench 
managers in the EU and increase the cost of takeovers.2F 3  The convergence of 
shareholder protection in European takeover law may have a similar effect, as strict 
takeover regulation introduces more rules and sets up stringent provisions that may 
make takeover more expensive and thus reduce the efficiency of takeover market. 
We thus hypothesize that strict takeover law regulation as a whole increases 
inefficiencies and thus reduces combined wealth gains to bidders and targets.3F4  The 
alternative hypothesis is that strict takeover law succeeds in its aim to establish a set 
of rules that balances the conflicts of interests in a takeover bid and increases the 
expected returns to the combined firm.  
 
Hypothesis 1 (efficiency hypothesis): Strict takeover law to protect shareholders 
reduces the combined wealth to bidder and target shareholders in takeovers. 
 
The ownership disclosure rule, mandatory bid rule, fair price rule, and sell-out rule 
all directly address potential acquisition strategies that transfer takeover gains from 
minority shareholders to acquirers. Stringent regulation to protect shareholders in 
takeovers will often directly reduce the acquirer’s return. This is no surprise, as these 
rules are designed to protect target shareholders from exploitation by bidders. If a 
country adopts them, we expect bidder returns to decrease. Conversely, we expect 
bidder returns to increase if a country adopts the squeeze-out rule. Takeover rules 
may also affect bidder returns more indirectly. Strict ownership disclosure can 
increase intense competition among bidders and lead bidders to overpay in a 
transaction. The mandatory bid rule and sell-out rights, for example, may reduce the 
gains of bidding firms indirectly by shifting the bargaining power from the bidder to 
target shareholders (Goergen et al., 2005; McCahery et al., 2004). Both mechanisms 
will result in higher transfer prices. Based on the preceding discussion, we posit that 
strict takeover law may transfer wealth from bidders to targets: 
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Hypothesis 2 (wealth transfer hypothesis): Strict takeover law to protect 
shareholders reduces the wealth of bidder shareholders. 
 
Stringent takeover regulation protects target shareholders from expropriation by 
bidders by increasing information transparency, providing more opportunity for 
minority shareholders to participate in a takeover process and eradicating the 
pressure-to-tender problem, as discussed in Section 2.1. We would thus expect strict 
takeover law to increase the wealth of target shareholders.  
 
However, the target’s value may decrease as a result of the increased agency conflicts 
within the target firm because value is either appropriated by management or lost in 
suboptimal solutions to agency problems. To minimize agency conflicts in target 
firms, takeover law governs the use of defensive tactics available to the target 
management in a takeover bid. Supporters of the board defense school believe that 
providing boards with the power to defend themselves in takeovers should be 
beneficial because takeover defenses are used by the target management when they 
believe the firm has hidden values or when they believe resistance will increase the 
bidding price (Bebchuk, 2002). With better information in an imperfect capital 
market, the management negotiating on behalf of the shareholders prevents coercive 
bids (Berglöf and Burkart, 2003; Bebchuk, 2002). However, with more defensive 
tactics, target management has more opportunities to pursue objectives other than the 
interests of the shareholders, which could increase the costs of a takeover bid and 
consequently lead to fewer takeovers. Because the agency conflict between 
management and shareholders is particularly pronounced in takeovers, some argue 
that management should not have defensive power in takeover bids (Sokolyk, 2011; 
Goergen et al., 2005; McCahery et al., 2004; Bebchuk, 2002).  
 
To reduce the agency problem, strict takeover law tends to limit the anti-takeover 
measures that target managements might be entitled to use in a takeover bid.4F5 For 
example, the management neutrality rule requires the target management to obtain 
the explicit authorization from its shareholders before they adopt any defensive 
actions to frustrate a takeover bid. By reducing defensive measures available to the 
target management, it makes takeovers less costly and may thus increase the 
efficiency of the takeover market. The management neutrality rule could effectively 
reduce agency conflicts in a takeover and increase investor confidence in the 
acquisition, which may lead to higher returns to target shareholders. Based on our 
discussion of shareholder protection in the takeover process, we propose that a 
stricter takeover law will lead to higher target announcement returns.  
 
11 
 
Hypothesis 3 (shareholder protection hypothesis): Strict takeover law to protect 
shareholders increases the wealth of target shareholders. 
 
Table 1 summarizes our empirical predictions based on our discussion of takeover 
law and its key provisions. 
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Table 1 
Summary of empirical predictions on the effect of strict takeover law and key provisions 
 Empirical prediction for 
announcement return 
 
 Combined Bidder Target Main rationale 
Takeover law 
index 
- - + Increases the protection of target shareholders in the 
event of a takeover attempt. Targets gain at the 
expense of bidders, while increasing regulation and 
managerial entrenchment reduce the overall 
efficiency of takeovers. 
Ownership 
disclosure 
- - + Limits the initial stake in a target firm that is the 
primary source of profits for bidders. It also 
increases the transparency of a takeover bid and may 
increase the likelihood of competing bids, profiting 
target shareholders. May also entrench target 
managers, reducing the overall efficiency of the 
takeover. 
Mandatory bid - - + Protects the minority shareholders by providing them 
with an opportunity to exit the company in the event 
of a change of control. May also entrench target 
managers, reducing the overall efficiency of the 
takeover. 
Fair price for 
minority 
- - + Benefits minority shareholders by guaranteeing a fair 
price relative to the market value of the target’s 
shares in a takeover bid. Bidders are less likely to 
exploit target shareholders, but this rule might 
increase financing costs and make takeovers more 
expensive when bidders attempt a takeover bid, 
which may reduce the overall takeover efficiency. 
Squeeze-out right + + - Can be used to control the free-rider problem in 
takeovers thereby making value-increasing takeovers 
feasible. Because acquirers can squeeze out the 
minority shareholders in the target firm, acquirers 
may benefit at the expense of target shareholders. 
Sell-out rights - - + The pressure to tender the shares is reduced for 
minority shareholders, as they can sell their shares 
later, but this may come at a price for bidders. 
Management 
neutrality 
+ + + Addresses potential agency problems between the 
target’s shareholders and management. This reduces 
management defenses in a bid, makes it less costly 
for bidders to reach an agreement with target 
shareholders, and thus increases takeover efficiency. 
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3. Constructing a takeover law index 
 
We construct a takeover law index to capture country-level regulation that is most 
relevant in the event of a takeover attempt. Takeover laws vary significantly between 
counties and over time. 5F6 In the past three decades, the implementation of the EU 
takeover directive may be seen as the single most important development in EU 
takeover law. As discussed in Section 2, we focus our investigation on the main 
provisions included in the directive when constructing the takeover law index. 6F 7 
Focusing on these provisions will also provide direct evidence on the convergence 
of takeover regulation in Europe in general and as a result of the takeover directive 
in particular. 
 
To enable a direct and systematic comparison of takeover law through time and 
across countries, we construct a takeover law index using hand-collected data on 
legal provisions. Specifically, the index measures whether a country has 
implemented ownership disclosure requirements7F8, the mandatory bid rule, the fair 
price rule for minority shareholders, squeeze-out rights for the bidder, sell-out rights 
for target shareholders, and the management neutrality rule. These six legal 
provisions, which have been identified in the literature as important for the regulation 
of takeovers (see Section 2), are critical in a takeover bid because they directly 
determine the bidder’s incentive to make a takeover bid and the target’s acceptance 
of a bid as well as the distribution of any takeover gains. With the exception of 
Nenova’s (2003)8F9 static cross-sectional indices for the development of takeover law, 
no indices exist that comprehensively and specifically capture takeover regulations.9F10 
We construct the index in a dynamic form, because the dynamic nature of our index 
is crucial for the identification of economic effects distinct from unobserved cross-
sectional country effects.  
 
Another complex issue in coding and weighting any legal rules is to what extent we 
should code a rule to reflect the diversity and quality of the rules. The six takeover 
law provisions in the index evolve over time and present great variation. To capture 
the complexity of takeover law provisions and the effect of the rules in practice, 
individual takeover law provisions are normalized in the range from zero to one with 
intermediate values whenever we can distinguish them. For example, following 
Armour et al. (2007), we set the index component for ownership disclosure equal to 
one if the shareholders have to disclose ownership when owning at least 3 percent of 
the company's capital, equal to 0.75 if this threshold is 5 percent, equal to 0.5 for a 
10 percent threshold, equal to 0.25 if the threshold is 25 percent and zero otherwise. 
Table 2 defines the coding of takeover law provisions. 
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Table 2 
Coding of takeover law provisions 
This table defines the coding of the components of the takeover law index used in this study. 
Variable Definition 
Ownership 
disclosure 
Following Armour et al. (2007), it equals 1 if the shareholders who 
acquire at least 3% of the company's capital have to disclose it; equals 
0.75 if this concerns 5% of the capital; equals 0.5 if this concerns 10%; 
equals 0.25 if this concerns 25%; otherwise zero. 
Mandatory bid Following Armour et al. (2007), it equals 1 if there is a mandatory public 
bid for the entirety of shares in case of purchase of 30% or 1/3 of the 
shares; equals 0.5 if a mandatory bid is triggered at a higher percentage 
(such as 40% or 50%); equals 0.5 if there is a mandatory bid rule but 
no specific percentage required; further, it equals 0.5 if there is a 
mandatory bid rule, but the bidder is only required to buy part of the 
shares, and equals zero if there is no mandatory bid rule at all. 
Fair price for the 
minority 
shareholders 
Equals 1 if the mandatory offer is restricted by law to offer some 
measures of a market price (usually an average price paid for the same 
securities over a period of six to twelve months prior to the offer) and 
zero otherwise. 
Squeeze-out rights Equals negative 1 if the majority shareholders can squeeze the minority 
shareholders out at a certain level of ownership (usually 90% or more) 
and zero otherwise. 
Sell-out rights Equals 1 if the minority shareholders can require the majority owner to 
buy them out at a certain level of ownership (usually 90% or more) and 
zero otherwise. We code the sell-out rights rule with a value of one and 
zero because all sample countries employing a sell-out rule use 90% or 
more as the threshold to trigger the sell-out rights rule. Among those 
countries, only Germany, France, Netherland, Belgium, Czech 
Republic use 95% as the threshold while the other countries use 90% 
as the threshold. A similar reasoning applies to the coding of the 
squeeze-out rights rule.  
Management 
neutrality 
Equals 1 if there is a strict obligation for the target management to 
maintain neutrality in a bid, 0.5 if there is a management neutrality rule 
but subject to the reciprocity rule and zero otherwise. 
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We hand-collect the raw legal data directly from the primary legislation in a given 
country (i.e., takeover laws and regulation, companies law, securities laws, stock 
exchange regulations and decrees). The legal sources are summarized in Appendix 
B.  Following Nenova (2003) and Armour et al. (2007), the takeover law index is 
calculated as the aggregate of the six takeover law components. The squeeze-out rule 
is weighted negatively (i.e., negative one if there is a squeeze-out rule in place and 
zero otherwise), because we expect squeeze-out thresholds defined by law to benefit 
the bidder, contrary to the other takeover law provisions which aim to protect target 
shareholders. This gives a theoretical total range of [−1, 5]. A higher index score 
represents a stricter takeover law from the bidder’s viewpoint and a more favorable 
legal environment for target shareholders. 
 
Table 3 demonstrates the development of takeover law in the EU. Our index indicates 
that takeover laws in EU countries have been substantially improved since late 1980s, 
especially in terms of the protection offered to the minority shareholders. The mean 
value of the takeover law index for the sixteen major European countries was 0.67 
(out of a score of 5) in 1986, but it has reached 3.47 in 2010. In general, there are 
three big turning points between 1986 and 2010. The first improvement occurred in 
1989. Before 1989, only a few countries provided a good protection to the target 
shareholders in the case of a takeover bid. The average score of the takeover law 
index was 0.86 out of a score of 5 in 1988, in which the highest level of protection 
was provided by the UK, Denmark and Sweden.10F 11  The second improvement 
happened in the late 1990s. With the trend of globalization and the development of 
the stock market, more takeover bids occurred after 1996, and the number of takeover 
bids peaked in 2000 (see Table 4, Panel B). Growing takeover activity might have 
drawn the attention of regulators to provide an appropriate takeover regulation to 
facilitate the market for corporate control.11F12 Simultaneously, the increased number 
of takeovers may also have led to a higher demand for an appropriate takeover law 
to protect the target shareholders. 12F13 The third improvement took place after 2006 
with the introduction of the European Directive 2004/25/EC. Its adoption in member 
states substantially enhanced the quality of takeover laws in some countries after 
2006 (see Table 14). In 2009, the average takeover law index reached its highest level 
of 3.47 during the sample period. In sum, our takeover law index shows that 
European takeover law has continued to converge towards greater shareholder 
protection. 
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Table 3 
Takeover law index for European countries, 1986–2010 
This table reports the takeover law index for our sample countries in the period 1986–2010. The takeover law index measures the quality of takeover law in a given 
country. It takes the value of the accumulation of six variables, as defined in Table 2: (1) ownership disclosure, (2) mandatory bid, (3) fair price for the minority
shareholders, (4) squeeze-out rights (negatively coded); (5) sell-out rights; and (6) management neutrality. Theoretically possible index values are in the range [–1, 5]. 
A higher value indicates a takeover law more favorable for target shareholders. Source: Country's Takeover Law and Regulation, Companies Law, Securities Laws, 
and Stock Exchange Regulation; own construction. 
Year AUT BEL CZE DNK ESP FIN FRA DEU GBR GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT SWE
1986 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.5 0.25 5.75 0 5.75 1 0 1 0.5 1.5
1987 0 0 0 2 0 0 0.75 0.25 5.75 0 5.75 1 0 1 0.5 1.5
1988 0 0 0 2 1.25 0 0.75 0.25 5.75 0 5.75 1 0 1 0.5 1.5
1989 0.5 3.25 0 2 1.25 2 2.25 0.25 6 0 6 1 0 1 0.5 1.5
1990 0.5 3.25 0 2 1.25 2 2.25 0.25 6 0 6 1 0 1 0.5 1.5
1991 0.5 3.25 0 2 3.25 2 2.25 0.25 6 0 6 1 0 1 0.5 1.5
1992 0.5 3.25 0 2 3.25 2 4.75 0.25 6 0.5 6 3.5 0.5 1.75 0.5 1.5
1993 0.5 3.25 0 2 3.25 2 4.75 0.25 6 0.5 6 3.5 0.5 1.75 0.5 1.5
1994 0.5 3.25 0 2 3.25 2 4.75 0.75 6 0.5 6 3.5 0.5 1.75 0.5 1.75
1995 0.5 3.25 0 2.25 3.25 2 4.75 0.75 6 0.5 6 3.5 0.5 1.75 2 1.75
1996 0.5 3.25 1 2.25 3.25 2 4.75 0.75 6 0.5 6 3.5 0.5 1.75 2 1.75
1997 0.5 3.25 1 2.25 3.25 4 4.75 0.75 6 0.5 4.75 3.5 0.5 1.75 2 1.75
1998 3.25 3.25 1 2.25 3.25 4 4.75 0.75 6 0.5 3.75 5 0.5 1.75 2 1.75
1999 3.25 3.25 1 2.75 3.25 4.25 4.75 0.75 6 0.5 3.75 5 0.5 1.75 6 3.25
2000 3.25 3.25 1 2.75 3.25 4.25 4.75 0.75 6 0.5 3.75 5 0.5 1.75 6 3.25
2001 3.25 3.25 4.25 2.75 3.25 4.25 4.75 0.75 6 0.5 3.75 5 0.5 1.75 6 3.25
2002 3.25 3.25 4.25 2.75 3.25 4.25 4.75 5.25 6 3 3.75 5 0.5 1.75 6 3.25
2003 3.25 3.25 4.25 2.75 3.25 4.25 4.75 5.25 6 3 3.75 5 0.5 1.75 6 3.75
2004 3.25 3.25 4.25 2.75 3.25 4.25 4.75 5.25 6 3 3.75 5 0.5 1.75 6 3.75
2005 3.25 3.25 4.25 2.75 3.25 4.25 4.75 5.25 6 3 3.75 5 0.5 1.75 6 5.75
2006 4.75 3.25 4.25 3.25 3.25 4.75 5.25 5.25 6 5.5 4.75 5 5.5 3.75 6 5.75
2007 4.75 4.75 4.25 3.25 6 4.75 5.25 5.5 6 5.75 5.75 5.5 5.5 4.75 6 5.75
2008 4.75 4.75 5.75 3.25 6 4.75 5.25 5.5 6 5.75 5.75 5.5 5.75 4.75 6 5.75
2009 4.75 4.75 5.75 5.25 6 4.75 5.25 5.5 6 5.75 6 5.5 5.75 4.75 6 5.75
2010 4.75 4.75 5.75 5.25 6 4.75 5.25 5.5 6 5.75 6 5.5 5.75 4.75 6 5.75
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4. Data and Method 
 
4.1 Takeover sample 
 
Our sample of transactions contains all attempted takeovers in EU countries for the 
period between 1986 and 2010 from Thomson Financial (SDC Platinum). We 
include all tender offers, mergers and acquisitions, but exclude minority stake 
purchases, leveraged buyouts, privatizations, spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-tender 
offers, exchange offers and repurchases. This specific period is selected because 
takeovers started to be prevalent after the 1986 Single Market Act was signed in the 
European Union. It also covers the evolution of the takeover regulation in several 
countries both before and after becoming EU member states.  
 
The sample must meet the following requirements: (1) takeovers, announced 
between 1986 and 2010, are targeting EU firms; (2) targets are publicly traded firms 
in an EU country, while bidders can be publicly traded firms in any country; (3) the 
bidder owns less than 50 percent of the target shares before the deal and intends to 
own more than 50 percent of the target firm after the transaction; (4) deal value is 
disclosed and is at least one million US dollars; (5) multiple bids announced within 
14 days are excluded from the analysis; (6) bid price is available from Thomson 
Financial, LexisNexis or the Financial Times; and (7) share prices are available from 
Datastream. These requirements result in a final sample of 1,273 takeovers involving 
target firms from the sixteen major European countries. The takeover attempts in our 
sample are made by 969 unique bidders with a total deal value of US$2,151 billion 
and an average of US$1,690 million. 
 
Firms have most actively acted as the bidders and the targets in the UK, France and 
Germany. The second largest proportion of bidders is from the US. As shown in 
panel B of Table 4, the takeover market grew slowly until the mid-1990s, developed 
rapidly after 1997 and peaked with the dot-com boom in 2000. After a slight rebound 
in 2005, the number of EU takeovers decreased again following the global economic 
recession in 2008, back to levels last seen in the late 1990s.   
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Table 4  
Summary statistics 
Panel A. Dependent variables and main control variables 
This panel reports descriptive statistics for attempted takeovers involving public acquirers and public 
targets in European countries during 1986–2010. Firm accounting figures are based on the fiscal year data 
before the takeover announcement. For dummy variables, only the proportion of deals with the relevant 
attribute is shown in the “mean” column and other summary statistics are omitted. Significance levels for 
tests whether announcement returns and takeover premiums are zero: ***, **, * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
Variable N Mean Median SD Min. Max. 
Dependent variables 
Weighted CAR [–2, 2] (%) 1240 2.351*** 1.657 7.486 -18.675 26.139
Bidder CAR [–2, 2] (%) 1241 -0.563*** -0.524 7.490 -23.759 21.560
Target CAR [–2, 2] (%) 1273 17.295*** 12.462 20.913 -25.491 95.779
Takeover premium (%) 1027 30.599*** 26.450 34.725 -61.981 157.754
Successful takeover 1267 0.830
Days to completion 1204 92.761 63.000 108.379 1.000 1427.000
Challenged deal 1273 0.124
Takeover law variables 
Takeover index 1273 3.308 4.000 1.124 –1.000 4.000
Ownership disclosure 1273 0.884 1.000 0.155 0.000 1.000
Mandatory bid 1273 0.854 1.000 0.317 0.000 1.000
Fair price for minority 1273 0.897
Squeeze-out right 1273 0.846
Sell-out rights 1273 0.778
Management neutrality 1273 0.741 1.000 0.421 0.000 1.000
Deal characteristics 
Deal value ($m) 1273 1092.629 161.609 2741.729 1.938 15974.420
Toehold (%) 1273 5.409 0.000 12.044 0.000 50.000
Hostile bid 1273 0.104
Cash-only transaction 1273 0.391
Cross-border transaction 1273 0.390
Diversification 1273 0.443
Target (T) and bidder (A) characteristics 
(T) CAR run-up 1273 0.089 0.053 0.258 -1.169 2.171
(T) Age 1273 13.224 9.465 10.923 0.287 45.881
(T) Total assets ($m) 1273 1755.096 168.550 7594.475 1.793 176293.111
(T) Tobin's Q 1273 2.006 0.793 4.352 0.162 31.070
(T) Leverage 1273 0.204 0.176 0.171 0.000 0.759
(T) Cash flow 1273 0.094 0.107 0.145 -0.692 0.452
(T) Distressed 1273 0.240
(A) Age 1273 15.447 13.051 11.100 0.096 45.580
(A) Total assets ($m) 1273 8977.613 983.93633744.821 0.047 626933.000
(A) Cash flow 1273 0.116 0.118 0.106 -0.342 0.458
 (continued on next page)
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Table 4 (continued) 
Panel B. Year, country, and sector distribution 
This panel reports the number of transactions by year, country and SIC division. The sample consists of 
all attempted takeovers involving public acquirers and public targets in European countries during 
1986–2010. The following abbreviations of country codes are used: AUT (Austria), BEL (Belgium), 
CZE (Czech Republic), DNK (Denmark), FIN (Finland), FRA (France), DEU (Germany), GRC 
(Greece), IRL (Republic of Ireland), ITA (Italy), LUX (Luxembourg), NLD (Netherlands), PRT 
(Portugal), ESP (Spain), SWE (Sweden), GBR (United Kingdom) for targets and bidders in EU 
countries and AU (Australia), CA (Canada), JP (Japan), NO (Norway), SZ (Switzerland), US (United 
States) for bidders in non-EU countries. 
Year  Nation  SIC division 
 Deals nxi  Targets Ij Bidders Iixj  Targets ij Bidders 
 N %   N % N %   N % N % 
1986 6 0.5  AUT 13 1.0 11 0.9  1 123 9.7 118 9.5 
1987 11 0.9  BEL 22 1.7 15 1.2  2 215 16.9 236 19.0 
1988 21 1.6  CZE 4 0.3 0 0  3 290 22.8 295 23.8 
1989 17 1.3  DEU 86 6.8 70 5.6  4 143 11.2 160 12.9 
1990 13 1.0  DNK 23 1.8 16 1.3  5 130 10.2 126 10.2 
1991 33 2.6  ESP 35 2.7 39 3.1  6 44 3.5 51 4.1 
1992 26 2.0  FIN 22 1.7 20 1.6  7 271 21.3 223 18.0 
1993 20 1.6  FRA 134 10.5 123 9.9  8 57 4.5 64 5.2 
1994 29 2.3  GBR 725 57.0 538 43.4        
1995 44 3.5  GRC 19 1.5 16 1.3        
1996 32 2.5  IRL 9 0.7 14 1.1        
1997 71 5.6  ITA 25 2.0 32 2.6        
1998 96 7.5  LUX 5 0.4 0 0        
1999 128 10.1  NLD 60 4.7 48 3.9        
2000 129 10.1  PRT 6 0.5 0 0        
2001 81 6.4  SWE 85 6.7 61 4.9        
2002 55 4.3  AU 0 0.0 9 0.7        
2003 59 4.6  CA 0 0.0 16 1.3        
2004 59 4.6  JP 0 0.0 8 0.6        
2005 76 6.0  NO 0 0.0 5 0.4        
2006 78 6.1  SZ 0 0.0 26 2.1        
2007 77 6.0  US 0 0.0 171 13.8        
2008 47 3.7  Other 0 0.0 35 2.8        
2009 36 2.8               
2010 29 2.3               
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4.2 Measure of wealth gains from takeovers 
 
We use cumulative abnormal announcement returns (CARs) as dependent variables 
to measure expected gains to bidders and target shareholders.13F 14  In addition to 
separate announcement returns for bidders and targets, the combined announcement 
returns for the notional firm consisting of target and bidder are computed by 
weighting the target’s and acquirer’s announcement returns according to their market 
capitalizations. This procedure assumes that social welfare gains are reflected by 
expected announcement returns to rational, unbiased residual claimants in takeovers, 
ignoring other potential stakeholders, such as bondholders, or external effects on the 
public. Descriptive studies reliably find a positive unconditional combined 
announcement return in takeovers (Andrade et al., 2001).  
 
To estimate returns to shareholders of both firms involved in the takeover, we follow 
Martynova and Renneboog (2008b) and Faccio et al. (2006) to calculate the CARs 
over the event window of [-2, +2] days around the takeover announcement, where 
day 0 is the announcement date. We employ a market model with local market 
indices as the benchmark to account for the possibility of market fragmentation and 
because additional factor returns are not available for the majority of the countries in 
our sample. Results for more sophisticated models used in the literature usually 
produce similar results. 14F15 We use main market indices with long time series for each 
firm in order to maximize data availability (e.g., FTSE All Share in the UK, DAX 30 
in Germany, SBF 120 in France). Parameters are estimated over the period of 260 to 
43 trading days prior to the takeover announcement. The period between 43 days to 
2 days before the announcement is used to calculate run-up excess returns. 
 
To test the combined wealth effects on bidders and targets, we calculate a total CAR 
weighted by the market capitalizations of targets and bidders two days before the 
announcement date. Panel A in Table 4 reports a mean value of the announcement 
returns for the combined entities of 2.4 percent, while targets gain 17.3 percent and 
acquirers earn −0.59 percent on average. 15F 16  All mean announcement returns are 
significant at the one percent level.  
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4.3 Identification strategy 
 
Our main models are estimated by ordinary least squares using heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors. 16F 17 In line with prior studies, we include a battery of deal 
features17F18 and firm characteristics18F19 into our models to control for other factors that 
might affect announcement returns. Summary statistics for these variables are shown 
in Panel A of Table 4. Notably, cross-border transactions are frequent in our sample 
(39 percent), which to some extent indicates the integration of the European market 
and the importance of an internationally compatible takeover law. Firm accounting 
data are based on the fiscal year before the takeover announcement. To limit the 
effect of outliers on our estimation results, we winsorize all variables at the 1 percent 
and 99 percent quantile. Variable definitions and data sources are summarized in 
Appendix A. Appendix C reports correlations between our variables. 
 
We obtain identification of the effects of takeover law on announcement returns from 
country-year variation in our key independent variables – the takeover law index and 
takeover law provisions. Year and country effects are included in the models to 
control for potentially unobserved year and country effects. These fixed effects 
ensure that the remaining country-year variation that is not captured by the country 
and year dummies can be used to estimate the effects of takeover law if we assume 
that the unique variation in country-years is indeed caused by changes in takeover 
law. At the same time, country and time effects purge variation unrelated to takeover 
law – such as macroeconomic trends, economic development, non-company legal 
frameworks or cultural aspects – which may improve estimation accuracy.19F20 Despite 
the substantial number of control dummies, coefficients are well behaved with 
variance inflation factors below 5, which shows that there is enough variation in 
takeover law to be exploited by our models.  
 
5. Results 
 
In this section, we show empirically that takeover law to protect shareholders 
increases overall shareholder wealth. As expected, target shareholders benefit from 
greater protection. Contrary to our hypothesis, however, this gain for target 
shareholders is not a result of a net transfer of wealth from bidders. These results can 
be explained by takeover regulation that increases the efficiency of the takeover 
process, which benefits both bidders and targets. We further provide analyses to 
investigate the sources of efficiency gains for bidders and targets. 
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5.1 Strict takeover law and total gains for the combined firm 
 
According to the efficiency hypothesis (hypothesis 1), we expect that strict takeover 
law to protect shareholders reduces the combined wealth to bidder and target 
shareholders in takeovers. Our findings in Table 5 show that the overall wealth effect 
of a stricter takeover law on the combined announcement returns of bidders and 
targets is positive and significant. Changing from the weakest protection afforded by 
takeover law (a takeover index of –1) to the strongest one (a takeover index of 5) 
increases the combined announcement returns to bidders and targets by 4.5 
percentage points. This result is inconsistent with our expectation that a stricter 
takeover law reduces shareholder wealth for the combined firm. In other words, 
stricter takeover laws succeed in protecting the welfare of minority shareholders and 
promoting the efficient allocation of productive resources.  
 
Another question we aim to answer is which legal provisions matter most in 
explaining the variation of takeover gains to targets and bidders. Among the six 
takeover law provisions analyzed in Table 5, ownership disclosure is the first single 
takeover law provision in place in most EU countries, followed by the mandatory bid 
rule.20F21 The general historical trend is that the squeeze-out rule, the sell-out rule and 
the management neutrality rule are introduced at a relative late stage. More 
specifically, most nations implement these three provisions during the late 1990s. In 
order to address potential collinearity among provisions and to provide insights into 
the historical development of takeover law, we develop our models stepwise by 
following the general time order of takeover law provisions in which they have been 
introduced in practice.  
 
The results for individual takeover law provisions are reported in Table 5 (models 2 
to 7).  We find that increased combined wealth effects to bidders and targets are 
associated with the ownership disclosure rule and the mandatory bid rule at 6.8 and 
5.6 percentage points, respectively. Both coefficients are significant at the five 
percent level. Regulation that was introduced later in time, such as squeeze-out or 
sell-out rights, has no detectable effect on total shareholder wealth gains. The 
positive effect of the ownership disclosure rule on combined wealth gains suggests 
that potential overbidding (Burkart, 1995, 1999) does not diminish the efficiency of 
the market for corporate control (see section 5.2.1). Our results further support the 
positive relationship between investor protection through disclosure and financial 
market development found in the literature (Jackson and Roe, 2009). In addition, the 
empirical finding on the mandatory bid rule supports the view that the mandatory bid 
rule increases the efficiency of the takeover market by generating value-creating bids 
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(De La Bruslerie, 2013; Burkart and Panunzi, 2003) rather than destroying firm value 
(Humphery-Jenner, 2012). 
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Table 5  
Effect of takeover law on weighted total announcement returns 
This table reports coefficients of OLS regressions of weighted announcement returns to target and bidder shareholders, that is, cumulative abnormal returns in a 
window of [-2, 2] trading days around the takeover announcement, weighted by target and bidder market capitalization two trading days before the announcement. 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, **, * indicate significance, 
respectively, at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Takeover index 0.755 (0.44)*                   
Ownership disclosure    6.468 (2.70)** 5.436 (2.73)** 5.964 (2.90)** 6.835 (2.93)** 6.851 (2.94)** 6.800 (2.93)** 
Mandatory bid       1.439 (1.22)  2.596 (2.15)  5.336 (2.54)** 5.615 (2.76)** 5.633 (2.77)** 
Fair price for minority          -1.310 (2.03)  -2.260 (2.06)  -2.256 (2.07)  -3.047 (2.14)  
Squeeze-out right             -2.566 (1.50)* -2.238 (1.80)  -2.875 (1.86)  
Sell-out rights                -0.594 (1.85)  0.050 (1.98)  
Management neutrality                   2.316 (2.07)  
Deal value -0.202 (0.29)  -0.202 (0.29)  -0.210 (0.30)  -0.220 (0.30)  -0.223 (0.29)  -0.225 (0.29)  -0.213 (0.29)  
Toehold -0.018 (0.02)  -0.020 (0.02)  -0.020 (0.02)  -0.021 (0.02)  -0.020 (0.02)  -0.020 (0.02)  -0.021 (0.02)  
Hostile bid 0.371 (0.68)  0.336 (0.68)  0.323 (0.68)  0.303 (0.68)  0.333 (0.68)  0.330 (0.68)  0.287 (0.68)  
Cash-only transaction 0.949 (0.51)* 0.910 (0.51)* 0.927 (0.52)* 0.934 (0.51)* 0.884 (0.51)* 0.876 (0.52)* 0.887 (0.52)* 
Cross-border transaction 0.575 (0.53)  0.659 (0.54)  0.654 (0.54)  0.677 (0.55)  0.710 (0.54)  0.714 (0.55)  0.707 (0.55)  
Diversification -0.827 (0.49)* -0.852 (0.49)* -0.858 (0.49)* -0.861 (0.49)* -0.865 (0.49)* -0.862 (0.49)* -0.862 (0.49)* 
(T) CAR run-up -0.972 (0.86)  -0.923 (0.86)  -0.961 (0.86)  -0.947 (0.87)  -0.960 (0.86)  -0.968 (0.86)  -0.952 (0.86)  
(T) Age -0.023 (0.02)  -0.022 (0.02)  -0.025 (0.02)  -0.025 (0.02)  -0.026 (0.02)  -0.026 (0.02)  -0.026 (0.02)  
(T) Total assets 1.096 (0.31)*** 1.062 (0.31)*** 1.089 (0.31)*** 1.102 (0.31)*** 1.099 (0.30)*** 1.102 (0.30)*** 1.105 (0.31)*** 
(T) Tobin's Q -0.216 (0.08)*** -0.219 (0.08)*** -0.217 (0.08)*** -0.215 (0.08)*** -0.224 (0.08)*** -0.224 (0.08)*** -0.218 (0.08)*** 
(T) Leverage 0.452 (1.32)  0.512 (1.32)  0.492 (1.31)  0.512 (1.32)  0.494 (1.32)  0.493 (1.32)  0.475 (1.32)  
(T) Cash flow 3.152 (2.06)  2.980 (2.04)  2.918 (2.05)  2.838 (2.05)  2.914 (2.04)  2.895 (2.04)  2.870 (2.04)  
(T) Distressed -1.277 (0.66)* -1.306 (0.66)** -1.315 (0.66)** -1.340 (0.66)** -1.364 (0.66)** -1.372 (0.66)** -1.354 (0.66)** 
(A) Age 0.026 (0.02)  0.029 (0.02)  0.027 (0.02)  0.028 (0.02)  0.027 (0.02)  0.027 (0.02)  0.027 (0.02)  
(A) Total assets -0.775 (0.16)*** -0.772 (0.16)*** -0.771 (0.16)*** -0.773 (0.16)*** -0.769 (0.16)*** -0.770 (0.16)*** -0.777 (0.16)*** 
(A) Cash flow 4.763 (2.78)* 5.146 (2.77)* 5.037 (2.77)* 5.093 (2.77)* 5.161 (2.74)* 5.182 (2.74)* 5.302 (2.75)* 
Target country effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry & year effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 1240  1240  1240  1240  1240  1240  1240  
R² (adj.) 0.084  0.083  0.083  0.083  0.084  0.083  0.084  
F-statistic 2.591  2.595  2.581  2.550  2.560  2.525  2.507  
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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While the effect of takeover law on combined shareholder wealth is positive and 
significant in the whole sample of takeovers, Table 3 draws attention to the 
development of takeover law in the UK: Amongst the sixteen major European 
countries, the UK provides a relatively high protection for minority shareholders 
throughout the sample period and – because of its relatively large contribution to 
our sample of takeovers – may have a large impact on our results. In addition, 
because our identification strategy relies on country-year variation, one might 
suspect that the results are driven by takeover law in the UK or by the dominance 
of UK targets in our dataset. To estimate the contribution to the combined 
shareholder wealth in other countries that undertake major developments of their 
takeover regulation in the past three decades, we analyze a takeover sample that 
excludes UK targets and drop the corresponding UK country effect from the 
models. 
 
The total wealth effect of a stricter takeover law shown in Table 6 is consistent with 
the findings in Table 5, but highly statistically significant and economically larger 
when we exclude UK targets from our analysis. The economic significance of the 
effect of takeover law increases from 4.5 to 6.9 percentage points for a change from 
the weakest to the strongest shareholder protection. The ownership disclosure rule 
and the mandatory bid rule both substantially increase the total wealth of the 
combined company. Notably, the coefficient of the ownership disclosure rule 
increases from 6.8 percentage points (in Table 5) to 13.6 percentage points (in Table 
6), while the coefficient of the mandatory bid rule rises from 5.6 percentage points 
(in Table 5) to 8.5 percentage points (in Table 6). Identification of economic effects 
of our takeover law index and individual provisions for non-UK targets also validates 
our main findings, providing stronger evidence that strict takeover law improves the 
efficiency of takeover process and that our takeover law measures capture sufficient 
country-year variation that is not captured by country or year effects alone.  
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Table 6  
Effect of takeover law on weighted total announcement returns – excluding UK targets 
This table reports coefficients of OLS regressions of weighted announcement returns to target and bidder shareholders, that is, cumulative abnormal returns in a 
window of [-2, 2] trading days around the takeover announcement, weighted by target and bidder market capitalization two trading days before the announcement. 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, **, * indicate significance, 
respectively, at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Takeover index 1.151 (0.55)**                   
Ownership disclosure    10.534 (4.40)** 10.229 (4.40)** 12.043 (4.65)*** 13.157 (4.67)*** 13.195 (4.69)*** 13.627 (4.70)*** 
Mandatory bid       2.548 (1.48)* 4.979 (2.53)** 8.135 (2.98)*** 8.065 (3.07)*** 8.537 (3.08)*** 
Fair price for minority          -2.578 (2.18)  -3.656 (2.23)  -3.675 (2.25)  -5.136 (2.49)** 
Squeeze-out right             -3.083 (1.54)** -3.190 (1.90)* -4.178 (2.03)** 
Sell-out rights                0.199 (2.05)  1.413 (2.24)  
Management neutrality                   3.354 (2.47)  
Deal value -0.298 (0.40)  -0.366 (0.40)  -0.354 (0.40)  -0.389 (0.40)  -0.420 (0.40)  -0.419 (0.40)  -0.386 (0.40)  
Toehold -0.039 (0.02)  -0.043 (0.02)* -0.042 (0.02)* -0.044 (0.02)* -0.043 (0.02)* -0.043 (0.02)* -0.044 (0.02)* 
Hostile bid -0.997 (1.49)  -1.280 (1.49)  -1.117 (1.49)  -1.233 (1.49)  -1.181 (1.49)  -1.183 (1.49)  -1.470 (1.50)  
Cash-only transaction 0.918 (0.81)  0.905 (0.81)  0.787 (0.81)  0.771 (0.81)  0.671 (0.81)  0.675 (0.81)  0.637 (0.81)  
Cross-border transaction -0.401 (0.74)  -0.267 (0.74)  -0.237 (0.74)  -0.155 (0.74)  -0.091 (0.74)  -0.094 (0.74)  -0.119 (0.74)  
Diversification -2.115 (0.78)*** -2.115 (0.78)*** -2.093 (0.78)*** -2.066 (0.78)*** -2.094 (0.77)*** -2.093 (0.77)*** -2.042 (0.77)*** 
(T) CAR run-up -2.461 (1.46)* -2.180 (1.45)  -2.398 (1.45)* -2.364 (1.45)  -2.384 (1.45)* -2.380 (1.45)  -2.368 (1.45)  
(T) Age -0.085 (0.05)* -0.081 (0.05)* -0.088 (0.05)* -0.088 (0.05)* -0.097 (0.05)** -0.096 (0.05)** -0.095 (0.05)** 
(T) Total assets 1.193 (0.44)*** 1.226 (0.44)*** 1.220 (0.44)*** 1.269 (0.44)*** 1.293 (0.44)*** 1.292 (0.44)*** 1.291 (0.44)*** 
(T) Tobin's Q -0.209 (0.07)*** -0.202 (0.07)*** -0.213 (0.07)*** -0.210 (0.07)*** -0.220 (0.07)*** -0.220 (0.07)*** -0.213 (0.07)*** 
(T) Leverage -0.709 (2.04)  -0.778 (2.04)  -0.717 (2.03)  -0.652 (2.03)  -0.693 (2.03)  -0.689 (2.03)  -0.663 (2.03)  
(T) Cash flow 1.930 (3.26)  1.453 (3.25)  1.436 (3.24)  1.022 (3.26)  1.128 (3.25)  1.139 (3.25)  1.101 (3.25)  
(T) Distressed -0.899 (1.01)  -0.870 (1.01)  -0.997 (1.01)  -1.115 (1.02)  -1.193 (1.01)  -1.191 (1.01)  -1.157 (1.01)  
(A) Age 0.058 (0.04)  0.071 (0.04)* 0.065 (0.04)  0.066 (0.04)* 0.064 (0.04)  0.064 (0.04)  0.062 (0.04)  
(A) Total assets -0.653 (0.25)*** -0.695 (0.25)*** -0.683 (0.25)*** -0.688 (0.25)*** -0.675 (0.25)*** -0.674 (0.25)*** -0.687 (0.25)*** 
(A) Cash flow 2.675 (3.88)  3.442 (3.86)  3.270 (3.86)  3.615 (3.87)  3.824 (3.85)  3.798 (3.87)  4.300 (3.88)  
Target country effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry & year effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 533  533  533  533  533  533  533  
R² (adj.) 0.083  0.087  0.091  0.092  0.097  0.095  0.097  
F-statistic 1.695  1.745  1.770  1.766  1.809  1.780  1.784  
P-value 0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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Table 6 further reveals some interesting findings regarding the remaining takeover 
law provisions. While Table 5 reports insignificant coefficients for the fair price rule 
and the squeeze-out rights rule, Table 6 shows that when excluding the UK targets 
the fair price rule and the squeeze-out rights rule significantly reduce the combined 
wealth gains to bidders and targets. More specifically, the fair price rule reduces the 
combined returns by 5.1 percentage points, whilst the gain enjoyed by the combined 
firm decreases by 4.2 percentage points when the local takeover law includes a 
squeeze-out rule. These findings indicate that strict takeover law could create the 
opposite of its intended effect in some cases and reduce the overall efficiency of 
takeovers. 
 
As a substantial part of our results is driven by the ownership disclosure rule, 
potential sample-related effects deserve further investigation. Eckbo and Langohr 
(1989) report that after France introduced disclosure rules for public tender offers in 
1970, takeover premiums increased substantially. Although this change happened 
before the start of our sample period, we run a test by excluding French and UK firms 
from the sample and re-estimate our models. Results for combined bidder-target 
CARs are qualitatively unchanged and quantitatively very similar. The effect of the 
takeover law index is slightly stronger (1.342) and more significant (p<0.01). Effects 
for individual provisions are also very similar to those in the non-UK models. 
Notably, the squeeze-out rule gains significance (p<0.05) and has a more negative 
effect (−4.9) on the combined CARs. 
 
5.2 Do target shareholders capture takeover gains from bidders? 
 
5.2.1 Does strict takeover law hurt bidders? 
 
We hypothesize that stricter takeover law reduces the returns to the bidder in a 
takeover bid because target shareholders have more opportunities to free-ride on the 
bidder’s takeover gains (e.g., due to low disclosure thresholds) and more bargaining 
power under stringent takeover regulation (e.g., due to mandatory bid rule). Contrary 
to our wealth transfer hypothesis (hypothesis 2), the insignificant coefficients in 
Table 7 suggest that greater shareholder protection does not harm bidders in 
takeovers. Our result is contrary to findings reported by Humphery-Jenner (2012), 
who uses the EU directive as a natural experiment and finds that it reduces 
announcement returns to bidders. An explanation for this finding is that a dynamic 
takeover law index across multiple countries that captures country-level regulation 
of the takeover process and enables a design that controls for unobserved time effects. 
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When we repeat this test for a sample excluding UK targets, we find the same 
insignificant effect on bidders (in these unreported results, the coefficient for 
takeover law is 0.76 with a standard error of 0.56). 
 
Since the squeeze-out rights rule gives majority shareholders the right to squeeze out 
the minority shareholders in order to mitigate the free-rider problem, we expect the 
returns to bidders in regimes with a squeeze-out right to be higher than in regimes 
without squeeze-out rights. Interestingly, and contrary to our expectation of a 
positive relationship between the squeeze-out rights rule and bidders’ CARs, the 
results show a statistically insignificant effect. One may further expect that the 
mandatory bid rule and the sell-out rights rule make transactions more expensive to 
acquiring firms by reducing the pressure on minority shareholders to tender and 
shifting the bargaining power from the bidder to target shareholders. However, we 
find no effect of these takeover law provisions on bidders’ announcement returns.  
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Table 7 
Effect of takeover law on bidder announcement returns 
This table reports coefficients of OLS regressions of announcement returns to bidder shareholders, that is, cumulative abnormal returns in a window of  
[-2, 2] trading days around the takeover announcement. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. Significance levels: ***, **, * indicate significance, respectively, at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Takeover index 0.343 (0.44)                     
Ownership disclosure    2.790 (2.91)   1.996 (2.92)   2.253 (3.06)   2.736 (3.13)   2.763 (3.13)   2.814 (3.14)   
Mandatory bid       1.104 (1.22)   1.694 (2.18)   3.290 (2.63)   3.921 (2.90)   3.917 (2.90)   
Fair price for minority          -0.669 (2.05)   -1.209 (2.11)   -1.195 (2.12)   -0.593 (2.19)   
Squeeze-out right             -1.512 (1.48)   -0.759 (2.02)   -0.271 (2.12)   
Sell-out rights                -1.356 (2.22)   -1.853 (2.33)   
Management neutrality                   -1.783 (2.03)   
Deal value -0.915 (0.28) *** -0.923 (0.28) *** -0.929 (0.28) *** -0.933 (0.28) *** -0.934 (0.28) *** -0.938 (0.28) *** -0.947 (0.28) *** 
Toehold 0.003 (0.02)   0.002 (0.02)   0.002 (0.02)   0.002 (0.02)   0.002 (0.02)   0.002 (0.02)   0.002 (0.02)   
Hostile bid -1.533 (0.66) ** -1.555 (0.67) ** -1.565 (0.67) ** -1.576 (0.67) ** -1.558 (0.67) ** -1.564 (0.67) ** -1.531 (0.67) ** 
Cash-only transaction 0.563 (0.51)   0.555 (0.51)   0.568 (0.51)   0.573 (0.51)   0.544 (0.51)   0.528 (0.51)   0.519 (0.51)   
Cross-border transaction 0.509 (0.54)   0.547 (0.55)   0.543 (0.55)   0.555 (0.55)   0.576 (0.55)   0.584 (0.56)   0.589 (0.56)   
Diversification -0.418 (0.49)   -0.418 (0.49)   -0.423 (0.49)   -0.424 (0.49)   -0.424 (0.49)   -0.418 (0.49)   -0.419 (0.49)   
(T) CAR run-up -0.149 (0.86)   -0.129 (0.85)   -0.159 (0.86)   -0.153 (0.86)   -0.162 (0.86)   -0.181 (0.86)   -0.193 (0.86)   
(T) Age -0.017 (0.02)   -0.016 (0.02)   -0.018 (0.02)   -0.018 (0.02)   -0.019 (0.02)   -0.019 (0.02)   -0.019 (0.02)   
(T) Total assets 0.691 (0.29) ** 0.688 (0.29) ** 0.708 (0.29) ** 0.715 (0.29) ** 0.712 (0.29) ** 0.721 (0.29) ** 0.719 (0.29) ** 
(T) Tobin's Q -0.166 (0.09) * -0.167 (0.09) * -0.166 (0.09) * -0.164 (0.09) * -0.170 (0.09) ** -0.170 (0.09) ** -0.174 (0.09) ** 
(T) Leverage 1.266 (1.32)   1.287 (1.32)   1.271 (1.32)   1.281 (1.32)   1.269 (1.32)   1.267 (1.32)   1.282 (1.32)   
(T) Cash flow 2.110 (2.02)   2.088 (2.02)   2.040 (2.01)   1.997 (2.01)   2.038 (2.01)   1.995 (2.01)   2.016 (2.01)   
(T) Distressed -1.040 (0.61) * -1.054 (0.61) * -1.061 (0.61) * -1.074 (0.61) * -1.088 (0.61) * -1.108 (0.61) * -1.122 (0.61) * 
(A) Age 0.028 (0.02)   0.030 (0.02)   0.029 (0.02)   0.029 (0.02)   0.029 (0.02)   0.028 (0.02)   0.029 (0.02)   
(A) Total assets 0.178 (0.15)   0.174 (0.15)   0.175 (0.15)   0.174 (0.15)   0.176 (0.15)   0.174 (0.15)   0.179 (0.15)   
(A) Cash flow 5.872 (2.87) ** 5.941 (2.87) ** 5.857 (2.87) ** 5.885 (2.87) ** 5.922 (2.85) ** 5.970 (2.85) ** 5.879 (2.86) ** 
Target country effects Yes  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Industry & year effects Yes  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Observations 1241  1241  1241  1241   1241  1241  1241   
R² (adj.) 0.060  0.060  0.060  0.059   0.059  0.059  0.059   
F-statistic 2.133  2.133  2.116  2.086   2.072  2.050  2.030   
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000  0.000   
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5.2.2 Does strict takeover law protect target shareholders? 
 
In this section, we estimate to what extent shareholder protection in takeovers 
increases the gains enjoyed by target shareholders. Regression results of target 
announcement returns are shown in Table 8. Consistent with our shareholder 
protection hypothesis (hypothesis 3), we find that the effect of takeover law on target 
announcement returns is positive and significant at the one percent level. In terms of 
economic significance, target shareholder returns would be 25 percentage points 
higher under the strictest takeover law compared to the weakest protection regime. 
The results provide strong evidence that takeover law protects the rights of target 
minority shareholders in a takeover bid. 
 
When investigating the relevance of takeover law, it is instructive to identify the 
heterogeneous impact of takeover law provisions on target announcement returns. 
We find that ownership disclosure significantly increases target announcement 
returns by 17 percentage points when we include all provisions in table 8. This is in 
contrast to findings for the US by Malatesta and Thompson (1993), who find a 
reduced effect of the number of acquisition attempts in a given period on stock 
returns after the Williams Act. This result can be explained by the increased 
transparency of takeovers due to ownership disclosure, which achieves its intended 
effect and protects the minority shareholders in a takeover bid. The mandatory bid 
rule, on the other hand, is significant only in the less than fully specified model 3, 
which includes only the ownership disclosure rule and the mandatory bid rule but no 
other provisions.  
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Table 8  
Effect of takeover law on target announcement returns  
This table reports coefficients of OLS regressions of announcement returns to target shareholders, that is, cumulative abnormal returns in a window of [-2,2] trading 
days around the takeover announcement. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance 
levels: ***, **, * indicate significance, respectively, at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Takeover index 4.135 (1.11)***                   
Ownership disclosure    22.461 (8.86)** 17.132 (9.14)* 14.805 (9.53)  17.242 (9.57)* 17.260 (9.56)* 17.075 (9.55)* 
Mandatory bid       7.369 (3.09)** 2.222 (5.63)  10.176 (7.92)  10.391 (7.76)  10.421 (7.77)  
Fair price for minority          5.840 (5.37)  3.202 (5.77)  3.213 (5.83)  0.583 (6.41)  
Squeeze-out right             -7.587 (4.26)* -7.316 (5.57)  -9.465 (5.90)  
Sell-out rights                -0.483 (5.35)  1.699 (5.84)  
Management neutrality                   7.854 (5.78)  
Deal value 0.818 (0.77)  0.759 (0.77)  0.729 (0.78)  0.758 (0.78)  0.767 (0.78)  0.765 (0.78)  0.811 (0.78)  
Toehold -0.139 (0.05)*** -0.150 (0.05)*** -0.147 (0.05)*** -0.145 (0.05)*** -0.143 (0.05)*** -0.143 (0.05)*** -0.144 (0.05)*** 
Hostile bid 6.437 (1.74)*** 6.372 (1.76)*** 6.289 (1.75)*** 6.364 (1.75)*** 6.452 (1.75)*** 6.451 (1.75)*** 6.313 (1.76)*** 
Cash-only transaction 1.930 (1.36)  1.807 (1.36)  1.909 (1.36)  1.869 (1.36)  1.733 (1.37)  1.728 (1.37)  1.772 (1.37)  
Cross-border transaction 3.073 (1.40)** 3.339 (1.41)** 3.326 (1.41)** 3.233 (1.42)** 3.324 (1.42)** 3.326 (1.42)** 3.307 (1.42)** 
Diversification 0.101 (1.27)  0.120 (1.27)  0.100 (1.27)  0.091 (1.27)  0.103 (1.27)  0.105 (1.27)  0.117 (1.27)  
(T) CAR run-up -3.426 (3.05)  -3.161 (3.06)  -3.372 (3.07)  -3.443 (3.08)  -3.494 (3.06)  -3.500 (3.08)  -3.439 (3.08)  
(T) Age -0.002 (0.06)  0.008 (0.06)  -0.003 (0.06)  -0.002 (0.06)  -0.006 (0.06)  -0.006 (0.06)  -0.006 (0.06)  
(T) Total assets -2.185 (0.83)*** -2.260 (0.83)*** -2.132 (0.83)** -2.181 (0.83)*** -2.202 (0.83)*** -2.200 (0.83)*** -2.188 (0.83)*** 
(T) Tobin's Q -0.883 (0.17)*** -0.888 (0.17)*** -0.881 (0.17)*** -0.891 (0.17)*** -0.920 (0.17)*** -0.919 (0.17)*** -0.901 (0.17)*** 
(T) Leverage -4.134 (3.70)  -3.890 (3.73)  -3.994 (3.71)  -4.112 (3.72)  -4.184 (3.72)  -4.185 (3.72)  -4.209 (3.72)  
(T) Cash flow 0.598 (6.53)  0.429 (6.53)  0.126 (6.54)  0.548 (6.54)  0.714 (6.53)  0.702 (6.54)  0.529 (6.53)  
(T) Distressed -0.766 (1.78)  -0.939 (1.79)  -0.975 (1.79)  -0.846 (1.79)  -0.935 (1.79)  -0.942 (1.80)  -0.873 (1.80)  
(A) Age -0.017 (0.06)  -0.001 (0.06)  -0.009 (0.06)  -0.010 (0.06)  -0.012 (0.06)  -0.012 (0.06)  -0.014 (0.06)  
(A) Total assets 1.428 (0.46)*** 1.409 (0.46)*** 1.409 (0.46)*** 1.423 (0.46)*** 1.434 (0.46)*** 1.434 (0.46)*** 1.405 (0.46)*** 
(A) Cash flow 18.474 (6.54)*** 19.321 (6.54)*** 18.715 (6.54)*** 18.490 (6.55)*** 18.527 (6.51)*** 18.540 (6.53)*** 18.985 (6.54)*** 
Target country effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry & year effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 1273  1273  1273  1273  1273  1273  1273  
R² (adj.) 0.143  0.138  0.141  0.141  0.143  0.142  0.143
F-statistic 4.031  3.899  3.939  3.902  3.908  3.852  3.828
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
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We further consider the marginal effect of more takeover law provisions in a legal 
framework. Government regulation of takeovers may exhibit decreasing returns 
which become more difficult to detect if more rules are added to an existing 
regulatory framework. We examine this by adding the square of the takeover law 
index to our models and find that effects of this squared index on our dependent 
variables – bidder, target, and combined returns – are all insignificant.21F22 
 
5.3 Sources of efficiency gains in the takeover process 
 
In this section, we explore potential explanations for the observed positive effects of 
strict takeover regulation grounded in the bargaining power of target shareholders 
and an overall improved efficiency of the takeover process. 
 
5.3.1 Takeover premiums 
 
Greater target returns can be a reflection of enhanced bargaining power of targets 
under legal regimes with stricter ownership disclosure requirements. This enhanced 
bargaining position could be reflected in larger premiums offered by bidders. If 
takeover law acts on target returns through higher premiums, we expect to find 
similar effects of ownership disclosure and mandatory bids on premiums as on target 
returns. Similar to Rossi and Volpin (2004) and Alexandridis et al. (2013), we 
calculate takeover premiums as bid price over the share price of the target, using the 
share price on the day before the announcement minus one.22F23 As shown in panel A 
of Table 4, the mean (median) takeover premium is 31 percent (26 percent) for EU 
target firms. Similar findings are also reported for European targets by Rossi and 
Volpin (2004) and Alexandridis et al. (2013).  
 
Empirical results are consistent with the expectation that stricter takeover law is 
associated with a higher takeover premium paid to the target shareholders. Model 1 
in Table 9 reports a significant and positive effect of stricter takeover law on the 
takeover premium. The economic significance of the effect of takeover law is 
substantial. Changing from the weakest to the strongest protection generated by a 
takeover law increases the takeover premium by 46 percentage points, compared 
with its effect of 25 percent on target announcement returns. This increased economic 
effect of our takeover law index suggests that a large proportion of the total effect on 
target announcement returns indirectly results from higher takeover premiums. 
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Table 9 
Effect of takeover law on takeover premiums 
This table reports coefficients of OLS regressions of takeovers premiums involving public acquirers and public targets in European countries in the period 1986–2010. 
Takeover premiums are defined as offered share price divided by pre-announcement share price one day prior to the announcement. Variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, **, * indicate significance, respectively, at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Takeover index 7.654 (2.31) ***                   
Ownership disclosure    18.076 (24.17)   -3.732 (24.70)   -3.191 (24.86)   1.834 (25.12)   2.719 (25.09)   3.382 (25.11)   
Mandatory bid       24.107 (6.40) *** 25.947 (11.39) ** 37.315 (14.06) *** 46.952 (15.03) *** 47.930 (15.09) *** 
Fair price for minority          -2.109 (10.80)   -6.887 (11.34)   -6.343 (11.33)   -10.064 (12.28)   
Squeeze-out right             -11.132 (8.09)   -1.388 (9.73)   -4.459 (10.49)   
Sell-out rights                -17.938 (9.97) * -15.471 (10.46)   
Management neutrality                   9.513 (12.13)   
Deal value 6.337 (1.42) *** 6.325 (1.43) *** 6.256 (1.42) *** 6.249 (1.42) *** 6.160 (1.42) *** 6.129 (1.42) *** 6.140 (1.42) *** 
Toehold -0.009 (0.10)   -0.037 (0.10)   -0.008 (0.10)   -0.009 (0.10)   -0.008 (0.10)   -0.013 (0.10)   -0.012 (0.10)   
Hostile bid 11.329 (3.62) *** 10.990 (3.64) *** 11.483 (3.62) *** 11.468 (3.62) *** 11.653 (3.62) *** 11.728 (3.62) *** 11.636 (3.62) *** 
Cash-only transaction 2.679 (2.55)   2.839 (2.57)   2.771 (2.55)   2.801 (2.56)   2.579 (2.56)   2.436 (2.56)   2.481 (2.56)   
Cross-border transaction 5.059 (2.47) ** 5.061 (2.48) ** 5.194 (2.47) ** 5.210 (2.47) ** 5.375 (2.47) ** 5.353 (2.47) ** 5.240 (2.47) ** 
Diversification -4.547 (2.30) ** -4.504 (2.31) * -4.408 (2.29) * -4.394 (2.30) * -4.474 (2.29) * -4.385 (2.29) * -4.368 (2.29) * 
(T) CAR run-up 16.846 (4.26) *** 16.821 (4.28) *** 16.802 (4.25) *** 16.830 (4.26) *** 16.836 (4.26) *** 16.337 (4.26) *** 16.416 (4.26) *** 
(T) Age -0.072 (0.11)   -0.049 (0.11)   -0.084 (0.11)   -0.084 (0.11)   -0.089 (0.11)   -0.097 (0.11)   -0.098 (0.11)   
(T) Total assets -7.190 (1.50) *** -7.368 (1.51) *** -7.007 (1.50) *** -6.991 (1.50) *** -6.994 (1.50) *** -6.891 (1.50) *** -6.838 (1.50) *** 
(T) Tobin's Q -1.988 (0.37) *** -1.987 (0.37) *** -1.995 (0.37) *** -1.993 (0.37) *** -2.000 (0.37) *** -2.018 (0.37) *** -1.998 (0.37) *** 
(T) Leverage 2.889 (6.86)   3.709 (6.90)   3.138 (6.85)   3.168 (6.86)   3.190 (6.85)   3.515 (6.85)   3.357 (6.85)   
(T) Cash flow -3.984 (8.78)   -3.953 (8.84)   -4.787 (8.78)   -4.893 (8.80)   -4.362 (8.81)   -4.764 (8.80)   -4.889 (8.80)   
(T) Distressed 2.033 (2.97)   1.862 (2.99)   1.626 (2.97)   1.596 (2.97)   1.496 (2.97)   1.143 (2.98)   1.245 (2.98)   
(A) Age 0.001 (0.11)   0.027 (0.11)   -0.008 (0.11)   -0.008 (0.11)   -0.007 (0.11)   -0.012 (0.11)   -0.015 (0.11)   
(A) Total assets 0.846 (0.75)   0.839 (0.76)   0.817 (0.75)   0.813 (0.75)   0.875 (0.76)   0.829 (0.75)   0.809 (0.76)   
(A) Cash flow 3.785 (10.49)   4.898 (10.55)   3.746 (10.48)   3.818 (10.49)   3.792 (10.49)   4.587 (10.48)   5.016 (10.50)   
Target country effects Yes  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Industry & year effects Yes  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Observations 1027  1027  1027  1027  1027  1027  1027  
R² (adj.) 0.148  0.139  0.151  0.150  0.151  0.153  0.152  
F-statistic 3.549  3.364  3.562  3.510  3.491  3.495  3.456  
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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Table 9 shows that the mandatory bid rule has the strongest effect on premiums 
among individual takeover provisions while it is significant in only one model of 
target announcement returns in Table 8. This result is consistent with our expectation, 
as the mandatory bid rule gives the minority shareholders an opportunity to exit the 
company in the case of a takeover and thus increases their bargaining power. In terms 
of its economic significance, the takeover premium paid to the target shareholders is 
48 percent higher in country-years with a mandatory bid rule. Our finding is in 
contrast to the negative effect of the mandatory bid rule on takeover premiums found 
by Rossi and Volpin (2004), potentially because we use a dynamic indicator for the 
mandatory bid rule rather than the static variable in their study and for this reason 
are able to distinguish differences between countries from the reform of takeover law 
over time. Our results thus provide empirical evidence that the mandatory bid rule 
protects the minority shareholders in a takeover bid as predicted theoretically by 
Bergström et al. (1997).  
 
Interestingly, ownership disclosure does not increase takeover premiums, although 
the estimated coefficient is substantial, in line with findings for the US by Nathan 
and O’Keefe (1989). The insignificant coefficient does not seem to be due to this 
provision’s coding, as the effect is still insignificant when it is coded as a simple 
binary indicator for the presence of a disclosure rule regardless of its threshold. All 
other provisions leave premiums unaffected. Although the squeeze-out and sell-out 
rules may possibly lead to transfers of wealth between tendering and non-tendering 
target shareholders, they do not change premiums offered by bidders.  
 
5.3.2 Do higher takeover premiums mean higher returns to shareholders? 
 
Premiums offered by bidders in takeovers should have a proportional effect on 
expected wealth gains to target shareholders as measured by excess stock returns 
around the announcement day. However, in the previous section we show that target 
returns benefit mainly from ownership disclosure, whereas premiums are mainly 
driven by the mandatory bid rule. Reasons for the relatively weak link between 
changes in premiums and changes in announcement returns due to takeover law may 
be found in the likelihood of successful completion of the transaction. A higher price 
offered to target shareholders will correspond to a higher gain only if the offer is not 
withdrawn due to, for example, external factors or anti-takeover action by the target’s 
managements. Conversely, final gains to target shareholders may be higher than the 
original offer price if the bidder is forced to enhance the offer during the takeover 
negotiation process. To examine the relationship between takeover premiums and 
shareholder wealth gains, we estimate the impact of takeover law on takeover success 
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and the mediation effect of premiums. 
 
If takeover law that leads to higher premiums does not proportionately increase target 
announcement returns, a difference in the probability for a successful takeover might 
be the reason for a differential effect of certain rules on premiums and returns. This 
theory receives no support in our tests (not reported here but available from the 
authors). Effects on the likelihood of a successful takeover are insignificant for 
ownership disclosure and the mandatory bid rule. Therefore, this finding suggests 
that higher premiums translate directly into wealth gains for target shareholders 
without takeover provisions moderating the likelihood of a successful takeover. We 
do find, however, a weakly significant decrease in the likelihood of success for 
takeovers under the fair price rule, which suggests that this rule makes the takeover 
process more difficult but at the same time leads to offsetting gains elsewhere such 
that announcement returns for bidders and targets are unchanged. Because we do not 
find effects of variables that affect either premiums or target returns, we suspect that 
the binary nature of our Probit regressions for takeover success leads to estimation 
uncertainty that makes it challenging to detect small hypothesized effects.  
 
As an alternative, we estimate the mediation effect of takeover premiums on target 
returns. This allows us to distinguish takeover law provisions that act directly on 
shareholder wealth from those that affect shareholder wealth indirectly through 
takeover premiums. Our findings in Table 10 show that takeover law acts on target 
announcement returns through the takeover premium. The competing hypothesis is 
that takeover law acts directly on target returns. The takeover law index satisfies the 
relevance criterion by significantly predicting takeover premiums, and premiums in 
turn predict announcement returns, with the strongest effect on target returns as 
expected. Sobel mediation tests are significant for target returns.  
 
In our mediation tests for bidder and total shareholder wealth as outcome variables, 
we find both direct and indirect effects of takeover law on combined shareholder 
wealth. Table 10 shows that takeover premiums mediate the effect of takeover law 
and in turn act on target and combined announcement returns. Interestingly, we also 
detect direct and positive effects of takeover law on bidder announcement returns 
and combined wealth. Premiums show weaker effects on bidder returns and 
combined returns. The Sobel mediation test is significant for combined returns, but 
not for bidder returns. Despite the reduced sample size compared with our main 
models due to missing values in the takeover premium, the effect of takeover law on 
combined returns is significant at the five percent level, and its effect on bidder 
returns is significant at the ten percent level. When we repeat these mediation tests 
for individual provisions (unreported separate regressions), we find that ownership 
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disclosure and the mandatory bid rule have a positive direct effect on combined 
returns and bidder returns.  
 
Table 10  
Mediation tests for takeover premium 
This table reports results for Sobel mediation tests on takeover premiums and the takeover law index. The 
hypothesis tested is whether takeover premiums (as measured by the offer price divided by the share price 
one day prior to the announcement) mediate the effect of takeover law on target announcement returns,
bidder announcement returns or combined target-bidder announcement returns. All models include the 
full set of covariates shown in Table 8 for targets, bidders and the combined entity, respectively. To
conserve space, only coefficients for the variables of interest are shown here. The number of observations
in this table is less than the observations in the related tables due to the additional requirement of having 
complete observations for takeover premiums. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, 
**, * indicate significance, respectively, at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 Combined CAR x Target CAR x Bidder CAR 
 
Model regressing dependent variable (in column header) on takeover index 
Takeover index (direct path) 1.183 (0.526)**  3.628 (1.377)***  1.020 (0.530)* 
            
Model regressing mediator on takeover law 
Takeover index (path a) 8.138 (2.328)***  7.658 (2.309)***  8.138 (2.328)*** 
            
Model regressing dependent variable on mediator and takeover law 
Takeover premium (path b) 0.035 (0.007)***  0.289 (0.017)***  0.002 (0.007)
Takeover index (direct path) 0.896 (0.524)*  1.411 (1.211)  1.002 (0.533)* 
            
Sobel mediation tests (using the coefficients above) 
Path a coefficient 8.138 (2.328)***  7.658 (2.309)***  8.138 (2.328)*** 
Path b coefficient 0.035 (0.007)***  0.289 (0.017)***  0.002 (0.007)
Indirect effect (Sobel test; a·b) 0.287 (0.101)***  2.217 (0.681)***  0.018 (0.061)
Direct effect of takeover index 0.896 (0.524)*  1.411 (1.211)  1.002 (0.533)* 
Total effect of takeover index 1.183 (0.526)**  3.628 (1.377)***  1.020 (0.530)* 
            
Model statistics for model explaining CAR with mediator and takeover law index (path b & direct path) 
Observations 1002   1027   1002  
F-test 2.660   8.490   1.840  
F-test p-value 0.000   0.000   0.000  
R² (adj.) 0.107   0.344   0.057  
 
 
5.3.3 Competing deals, toehold, and time to completion 
 
Our findings suggest that takeover law has effects on combined returns and bidder 
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gains that cannot be explained solely by takeover premiums. What additional factors 
could drive the positive effects of strict takeover law on the combined entity and 
targets? In this section, we investigate whether strict takeover law improves the 
efficiency of the takeover market through a closer examination on competing deals, 
toehold, and time to completion.23F24  
 
Stringent ownership disclosure standard can increase competition among bidders and 
lead bidders to overpay in a transaction. To further examine whether increased target 
returns are the result of improved deal efficiency under stricter takeover law, we 
estimate models that predict the likelihood of a proposed deal being challenged by a 
second bidder. Competing offers usually enhance the target’s bargaining position and 
should be accompanied by greater returns for target shareholders. Supporting our 
expectation, results in Table 11 show a positive effect of stricter ownership 
disclosure on the likelihood of a rival bidder challenging the deal. This result is in 
agreement with our findings of improved combined and target returns in country-
years with stringent ownership disclosure in Tables 5, 6, and 8. It suggests that the 
requirement to disclose the bidder’s ownership in the target improves the efficiency 
of takeovers. In addition, our models uncover a positive effect of the fair price rule 
on the likelihood of a bidding contest, which is consistent with the negative effect of 
the fair price rule that we find in our regression of the likelihood of success of 
takeover attempts under a fair price rule. 
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Table 11 
Deals more likely to be challenged under stricter ownership disclosure and fair price rule 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals one if the proposed transaction is challenged by a rival bidder and zero otherwise. We use data from 
Thomson Financial (SDC Platinum) for this variable. The table reports coefficients of Probit regressions of this indicator variable on the takeover law index and 
takeover law provisions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, **, * indicate significance, respectively, at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level. 
 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    
Takeover index 0.337 (0.13)***                   
Ownership disclosure    3.399 (1.32)** 3.046 (1.45)** 3.117 (1.72)* 3.506 (1.81)* 3.523 (1.86)* 3.582 (1.74)** 
Mandatory bid       0.434 (0.34)  -0.792 (0.67)  -0.292 (0.87)  0.013 (0.99)  0.009 (0.95)  
Fair price for minority          1.569 (0.67)** 1.281 (0.68)* 1.336 (0.67)** 1.106 (0.64)* 
Squeeze-out right             -0.475 (0.57)  -0.242 (0.60)  -0.487 (0.59)  
Sell-out rights                -0.505 (0.61)  -0.308 (0.65)  
Management neutrality                   1.064 (0.73)  
Deal value 0.211 (0.07)*** 0.216 (0.07)*** 0.211 (0.07)*** 0.220 (0.07)*** 0.224 (0.07)*** 0.223 (0.07)*** 0.231 (0.07)***
Toehold -0.013 (0.01)** -0.015 (0.01)** -0.015 (0.01)** -0.014 (0.01)** -0.014 (0.01)** -0.015 (0.01)** -0.015 (0.01)** 
Hostile bid 0.726 (0.18)*** 0.707 (0.18)*** 0.712 (0.18)*** 0.723 (0.18)*** 0.726 (0.18)*** 0.726 (0.18)*** 0.715 (0.18)***
Cash-only transaction 0.100 (0.14)  0.097 (0.14)  0.099 (0.14)  0.088 (0.14)  0.081 (0.14)  0.075 (0.14)  0.095 (0.14)  
Cross-border transaction -0.037 (0.13)  -0.019 (0.13)  -0.016 (0.13)  -0.039 (0.13)  -0.035 (0.13)  -0.030 (0.13)  -0.040 (0.13)  
Diversification -0.207 (0.13)  -0.202 (0.13)  -0.207 (0.13)* -0.214 (0.13)* -0.213 (0.13)* -0.210 (0.13)* -0.211 (0.13)* 
(T) CAR run-up 0.975 (0.23)*** 0.982 (0.23)*** 0.979 (0.23)*** 0.982 (0.23)*** 0.974 (0.23)*** 0.972 (0.23)*** 0.968 (0.23)***
(T) Age 0.002 (0.01)  0.003 (0.01)  0.002 (0.01)  0.002 (0.01)  0.002 (0.01)  0.002 (0.01)  0.002 (0.01)  
(T) Total assets -0.078 (0.08)  -0.086 (0.08)  -0.080 (0.08)  -0.090 (0.08)  -0.094 (0.08)  -0.091 (0.08)  -0.088 (0.08)  
(T) Tobin's Q -0.025 (0.02)  -0.025 (0.02)  -0.023 (0.02)  -0.026 (0.02)  -0.029 (0.02)  -0.028 (0.02)  -0.030 (0.02)  
(T) Leverage 0.011 (0.39)  0.047 (0.38)  0.041 (0.38)  0.041 (0.39)  0.048 (0.39)  0.052 (0.40)  0.030 (0.40)  
(T) Cash flow 0.626 (0.52)  0.557 (0.51)  0.554 (0.51)  0.651 (0.52)  0.680 (0.53)  0.649 (0.52)  0.656 (0.53)  
(T) Distressed -0.060 (0.16)  -0.058 (0.16)  -0.064 (0.16)  -0.049 (0.16)  -0.053 (0.16)  -0.061 (0.16)  -0.048 (0.16)  
(A) Age -0.002 (0.01)  0.000 (0.01)  -0.001 (0.01)  -0.001 (0.01)  -0.001 (0.01)  -0.001 (0.01)  -0.001 (0.01)  
(A) Total assets 0.010 (0.04)  0.005 (0.04)  0.006 (0.04)  0.007 (0.04)  0.006 (0.04)  0.005 (0.04)  0.002 (0.04)  
(A) Cash flow 0.788 (0.57)  0.906 (0.57)  0.864 (0.57)  0.781 (0.56)  0.798 (0.56)  0.808 (0.56)  0.868 (0.56)  
Target country effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry & year effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 1273  1273  1273  1273  1273  1273  1273  
McFadden R² (adj.) 0.040  0.038  0.038  0.042  0.041  0.040  0.040  
AIC 918.926  920.284  920.641  916.874  917.649  918.701  918.347  
LR test P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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Prior studies suggest that a stringent ownership disclosure limits the bidder’s profits, 
as the initial stake in a target firm is the primary source of profits for bidders (Burkart, 
1999). Bidders seem to be aware of the downsides of having to disclose their stake 
in the target which makes creeping acquisitions more difficult. While ownership 
disclosure increases the likelihood of a bidding contest, we find in Table 12 that it 
also increases the bidder’s toehold. A larger toehold suggests that bidders try to get 
into a better bargaining position by holding more target shares in anticipation of rival 
acquirers once their shareholding in the target becomes public knowledge. 
Interestingly, the mandatory bid rule does not seem to increase the bidder’s toehold, 
which suggests that bidders do not increase their toehold in anticipation of free-riding 
target shareholders but rather to protect against other bidders. 
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Table 12 
Larger toehold under stricter ownership disclosure 
This table reports coefficients of OLS regressions of the toehold (in percentage points) that the bidder owns in the 
target on the announcement date. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: 
***, **, * indicate significance, respectively, at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
 1    2    3     
Takeover index -0.294 (0.84)         
Ownership disclosure    12.391 (6.32)* 15.063 (6.70)**  
Mandatory bid       4.235 (4.53)   
Fair price for minority       -5.680 (3.85)   
Squeeze-out right       3.627 (3.79)   
Sell-out rights       -4.288 (3.76)   
Management neutrality       2.366 (5.12)   
Deal value -2.558 (0.49)*** -2.585 (0.48)*** -2.594 (0.48)***  
Hostile bid 1.288 (1.17)  1.067 (1.16)  0.936 (1.17)   
Cash-only transaction 2.744 (0.80)*** 2.736 (0.80)*** 2.723 (0.80)***  
Cross-border transaction -1.763 (0.81)** -1.563 (0.83)* -1.457 (0.83)*  
Diversification 1.431 (0.78)* 1.390 (0.78)* 1.419 (0.78)*  
(T) CAR run-up -0.883 (1.19)  -0.923 (1.17)  -0.846 (1.18)   
(T) Age 0.013 (0.03)  0.008 (0.03)  0.008 (0.03)   
(T) Total assets 2.342 (0.47)*** 2.361 (0.47)*** 2.409 (0.47)***  
(T) Tobin's Q 0.112 (0.11)  0.108 (0.11)  0.128 (0.11)   
(T) Leverage -1.673 (2.31)  -1.757 (2.32)  -1.614 (2.34)   
(T) Cash flow 2.287 (3.20)  2.089 (3.19)  1.535 (3.19)   
(T) Distressed 0.105 (0.95)  0.104 (0.95)  -0.050 (0.96)   
(A) Age -0.056 (0.03)* -0.052 (0.03)  -0.050 (0.03)   
(A) Total assets 0.867 (0.25)*** 0.845 (0.25)*** 0.810 (0.26)***  
(A) Cash flow -5.442 (3.25)* -5.469 (3.25)* -4.852 (3.28)   
Target country effects Yes  Yes  Yes   
Industry & year effects Yes  Yes  Yes   
Observations 1273  1273  1273   
R² (adj.) 0.124  0.127  0.129   
F-statistic 3.563  3.653  3.520   
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000   
 
These results explain why announcement returns may be higher under tight 
ownership disclosure requirements. The remaining puzzle is why premiums are not 
directly affected by ownership disclosure. We suspect that the high degree of noise 
in premium data can offer an explanation. Takeover premiums calculated from offer 
prices in SDC Platinum usually represent “final” premiums before the transaction is 
completed or withdrawn. In some cases involving multiple bidders, the final offer 
price is not recorded for all takeover attempts by competing bidders. In effect, the 
total premium paid to target shareholders is split into several smaller ones – one for 
each competing bidder – that are recorded over time. This underestimates final 
premiums (i.e., the final price paid by the successful bidder relative to the share price 
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before the first bidder’s offer) and may thus reduce the estimated effect of takeover 
law provision that increase the likelihood of bidding contests.  
 
If strict takeover law creates more competition among bidders, one might expect that 
it will make takeovers more expensive by increasing the deal completion time. 
However, the improved legal certainty for the parties involved in the transaction 
under stringent takeover regulation may compensate for this negative effect of strict 
takeover law on bidder returns. This prediction is supported by the overall negative 
effect of our takeover law index on the time to completion (i.e., a positive effect on 
the hazard rate of successful deal completion) in Table 13. The mandatory bid rule 
reduces the time to successful completion, while the squeeze-out rule lengthens it. 
The latter result can be explained by shareholders that anticipate the possibility of 
being squeezed out of the target firm and draw out the negotiation to secure a 
favorable outcome. Most importantly, the management neutrality rule, which was 
hotly debated during the negotiations leading to the EU directive, significantly 
shortens the time to completion. In sum, our additional results suggest that takeover 
law to protect shareholders benefits bidders and targets by reducing legal uncertainty 
and generally improving the efficiency of the takeover process. 
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Table 13  
Hazard rate models for successful deal completion 
This table shows coefficients for competing risks models (models 1-3) and a Cox proportional hazards model 
(model 4) for the time to successful completion of an attempted takeover. Time to completion is measured in days
from the announcement day. In models 1-3, the competing event is the unsuccessful completion of the deal. The 
proportional hazards model (4) treats unsuccessful takeover attempts as censored at the withdrawal date. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. The sample excludes takeover announcements for which the announcement date and 
effective date are the same, as these observations are not “at risk”. Significance levels: ***, **, * indicate 
significance, respectively, at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 Competing risks models 
Cox proportional 
hazards model 
 (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    
Takeover index 0.134 (0.06)**    0.150 (0.05)*** 0.139 (0.07)** 
Ownership disclosure    -0.764 (0.67)        
Mandatory bid    0.756 (0.45)*   
Fair price for minority    -0.281 (0.33)        
Squeeze-out right    -0.438 (0.24)*       
Sellout rights    0.061 (0.26)        
Management neutrality    0.560 (0.28)**       
Deal value -0.117 (0.05)*** -0.121 (0.05)***    -0.114 (0.05)** 
Toehold 0.000 (0.00)  0.000 (0.00)     0.000 (0.00)  
Hostile bid -0.869 (0.14)*** -0.880 (0.14)***    -0.879 (0.15)***
Cash-only transaction 0.119 (0.09)  0.120 (0.09)     0.119 (0.08)  
Cross-border transaction -0.114 (0.08)  -0.119 (0.08)     -0.116 (0.08)  
Diversification 0.102 (0.08)  0.099 (0.08)     0.106 (0.08)  
(T) CAR run-up -0.055 (0.13)  -0.070 (0.13) -0.053 (0.13)
(T) Age 0.004 (0.00)  0.004 (0.00)     0.004 (0.00)  
(T) Total assets -0.164 (0.05)*** -0.161 (0.05)***    -0.173 (0.05)***
(T) Tobin's Q -0.023 (0.01)  -0.022 (0.02)     -0.023 (0.01)  
(T) Leverage 0.280 (0.22)  0.271 (0.22)     0.264 (0.22)  
(T) Cash flow 0.007 (0.28)  -0.012 (0.28)     -0.007 (0.28)  
(T) Distressed -0.149 (0.10)  -0.156 (0.10)     -0.140 (0.10)  
(A) Age 0.009 (0.00)** 0.008 (0.00)**    0.009 (0.00)** 
(A) Total assets 0.036 (0.03)  0.040 (0.03)     0.039 (0.03)  
(A) Cash flow 0.011 (0.32)  0.087 (0.33)     0.004 (0.33)  
Target country effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry & year effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 1204  1204  1204  1204  
Log-Likelihood -5830.440  -5827.602  -5939.221  -5820.866  
Pseudo-LR test stat. 440.421  446.097  222.859  447.856  
Pseudo-LR test p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
McFadden R² (adj.) 0.025  0.025  0.010  0.025  
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6. Other robustness tests 
 
6.1 The EU directive as a natural experiment 
 
To harmonize the EU takeover market and to set up a minimum regulation at EU 
level, the EU Directive 2004/25/EC entered into force in May 2004. The directive 
may be seen as an exogenous event that affects the size and distribution of wealth 
gains in takeovers. In principle, this event may present an opportunity to directly 
measure the effects of the takeover law index developed in this paper and its 
constituent legal provisions. The directive required member states to implement it 
until 2006 and mainly affected the mandatory bid rule, the sell-out rights rule and the 
management neutrality rule in EU countries. Table 14 reports the implementation 
effect of the directive on the takeover law index and takeover law provisions. In 12 
out of 16 countries, national takeover laws were affected by the directive.  
 
To test the effect of the EU directive on takeover announcement returns and 
premiums, we construct a dummy variable that equals one if the takeover was 
announced on the day and in the period after the directive was implemented in a 
given country. When we add this dummy to our models for target, bidder and 
combined announcement returns and takeover premiums, the results of our takeover 
law index are consistent with our main results reported in Section 5. However, the 
EU directive dummy is never significant at the 5% level or better (results not reported 
here). It seems to have a weakly significant (p<0.1) negative effect on premiums. 
Coefficients remain insignificant if we replace the takeover law index with the 
directive dummy or remove time effects from the regression. In these cases, target 
announcement returns seem to be positively affected by the directive but are again 
only weakly significant. 
 
Our finding on bidder returns is different from Humphery-Jenner’s (2012). Using a 
dummy variable that equals one if the acquisition occurs after the implementation 
deadline for the takeover directive of 20 May 2006, Humphery-Jenner (2012) reports 
a significant and negative effect of the directive on bidder returns. The major 
disadvantage of using the EU directive as a natural experiment is that a dummy 
variable testing the difference in average announcement returns before and after the 
directive implementation date at the level of the EU (i.e., a time dummy variable 
using 20 May 2016 as the cut-off date) is indistinguishable from unobservable shocks 
affecting all countries, which is the design adopted by Humphery-Jenner (2012), and 
almost indistinguishable from time effects in our robustness test, which uses the 
44 
 
exact implementation date for each country. As a consequence, any time effects that 
control for such unobserved heterogeneity are highly correlated with the EU directive 
dummy, making it difficult to disentangle the directive’s effect from unobservable 
heterogeneity. In our robustness test in this section, we use the exact date when the 
directive was implemented in a country but do not find a significant effect of the 
directive. Because our main research design in this paper uses a long study period 
and includes more such exogenous changes in takeover law, it is able to successfully 
capture the effects of such changes as distinct from random time variation.  
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Table 14 
Implementation effect of the EU Directive on takeover law provisions  
This table reports the implementation effect of the EU directive on the takeover law index and takeover law 
provisions for the major European countries in the period 1986–2010. Implementation date is the date when member 
nations implement the directive into their national takeover law. The effect of the directive on takeover law 
provisions takes a value of one if that provision in the member nation must be raised to a higher level to satisfy the 
minimum standard of the directive, and zero if that provision remains unchanged or has a higher level than the 
directive before the implementation date.  
  Effect of the EU takeover directive 
  
Implementation  
date 
Ownership 
disclosure 
Mandatory
bid 
Fair 
price 
Squeeze- 
out 
Sell- 
out 
Management 
neutrality 
Austria 20 May 2006 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Belgium 1 April 2007 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Czech Rep. 1 April 2008 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Denmark 20 May 2006 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Finland 8 June 2006 0 1 0 0 0 0 
France 20 May 2006 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Germany 8 July 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Greece 30 May 2006 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Ireland 20 May 2006 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Italy 19 November 2007 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Luxembourg 20 May 2006 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Netherlands 24 May 2007 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Portugal 2 November 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain 13 April 2007 1 1 0 1 1 0 
Sweden 7 June 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 
UK 20 May 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
6.2 Investor protection 
 
The seminal work of La Porta et al. (1998) has highlighted the importance of investor 
protection for corporate finance. Recently, the effect of investor protection laws on 
mergers and acquisitions has been examined (Danbolt and Maciver, 2012; 
Martynova and Renneboog, 2008b; Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Rossi and Volpin, 2004). 
Other literature has examined wealth effects in mergers and acquisitions across 
countries and over time as well as in relation to the acquirer’s and target’s attributes 
such as corporate governance (Harford et al., 2012; Bhagat et al., 2005). To verify 
the contribution of this paper, we test whether existing investor protection indices 
are able to capture a similar degree of variation in premiums and announcement 
returns as the takeover law index we construct. 
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As a robustness test, we employ the shareholder rights index and the creditor rights 
index from Martynova and Renneboog (2011a). The shareholder rights index 
measures the level of protection for the shareholders against managerial 
opportunistic behavior, while the creditor rights index measures the protection given 
to creditors in the case of bankruptcy. Neither of these two indices is able to explain 
announcement returns if added to our main models (model 1 in Tables 5, 7, and 8). 
Both indices are statistically weaker than our takeover law index and only weakly 
significant (p<0.1) in regressions of takeover premiums. While shareholder 
protection contributes positively to premiums, higher creditor protection reduces 
premiums offered by bidders. Hence, the takeover law index may be better able to 
explain expected returns than broad investor protection indices, as our index reflects 
takeover provisions that matter more in the actual takeover process. 
 
Higher announcement returns could reflect market expectations of higher net value 
creation when takeovers are completed in an environment with better investor 
protection. Our results on target announcement returns are consistent with the 
positive effect found by Martynova and Renneboog (2008b). However, the effect of 
our takeover law index is significant at p=0.00022 (model 1 in Table 8), compared 
with a significance of p=0.005 for their minority shareholder protection index (model 
5 in Table 9 in their paper). Interestingly, their minority shareholder protection index 
loses its power to explain target returns when they include a general shareholder 
protection index. By contrast, a robustness test using the same shareholder protection 
index shows that our takeover law index significantly increases target returns after 
controlling for their shareholder protection index (see Section 5.2.2). This finding 
suggests that our specific takeover law index that incorporates the most relevant 
provisions that regulate the takeover process better captures the effect of takeover 
regulation on target announcement returns than a broad corporate governance index 
such as the minority shareholder protection index and the shareholder protection 
index. 
 
6.3 Alternative model specifications for individual provisions and control 
variables 
 
Although our models work well statistically in all regressions, correlations among 
individual provisions in our sample of country-years are substantial because some 
provisions, such as the mandatory bid and fair price rules, tend to be introduced at 
the same time. This degree of multicollinearity may limit the effectiveness of our 
models in attributing the effects of individual provisions. To safeguard against this 
concern, we introduce takeover provisions stepwise in our main models for 
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announcement returns and premiums. These main results show that, for example, the 
effect of the mandatory bid rule on premiums does not depend on the inclusion or 
exclusion of other provisions, but results are less clear for provisions introduced later 
in time. 
 
While the concern of multicollinearity in takeover provisions can be addressed by 
combining all individual provisions in our takeover law index or in principle by 
increasing the number of country-year observations, which would go beyond the 
scope of this paper, we perform an additional test to see which single provision has 
the largest explanatory power and whether adding other provisions increases the fit 
of the model. We build our models starting with the takeover provision that has the 
greatest explanatory power and then adding the next-best provision until the model 
fit does not improve significantly. Quantitative results (not reported here) are similar 
to our main results in Section 5. For regressions of combined announcement returns, 
ownership disclosure contributes the most to the model, in line with the findings in 
Table 5. Bidder CARs are not affected by any provision, again in line with our 
previous results. For target announcement returns, the fair price rule has the largest 
explanatory power when included as the only provision in the model. The mandatory 
bid rule would also explain a significant part of target CARs, but does not contribute 
much in addition to the fair price rule. Finally, the two provisions that significantly 
contribute to the explanation of takeover premiums are the mandatory bid rule and 
sellout rights. Sellout rights did not explain premiums in Table 9 but help explain 
premiums when added to a model right after the mandatory bid rule. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The potential for large societal and private wealth gains and losses, combined with 
its rich history and often heterogeneous legal and economic opinions, makes takeover 
regulation a complex and controversial topic among policymakers, managers, 
investors and academics alike. This study is the first to investigate the economic 
effects of regulation that governs the takeover process using a dynamic takeover law 
index. The time variation in takeover law enables a research design that controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity in both the time and country dimension. It contributes to 
the extant literature on takeovers (e.g., Humphery-Jenner, 2012; Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2011a, 2008b; Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Rossi and Volpin, 2004) by 
investigating the development of takeover laws in European countries and 
demonstrating empirically how takeover law plays an important role in determining 
wealth gains and transfers in acquisitions.  
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The question we address in this paper is to what extent legislative efforts have 
produced a takeover law that approaches a social optimum and whether the changes 
of takeover regulations affect wealth transfers between bidders and targets. We find 
that stricter takeover law increases the combined expected gains from takeovers for 
bidders and targets. In contrast to Humphery-Jenner (2012), our results show that 
stricter takeover law does not reduce the announcement returns to the bidders. 
Stricter takeover law does not harm bidding firms but balances the trade-off between 
bidders and targets. It protects the rights of the minority shareholders in target firms 
in the case of a takeover by substantially increasing target announcement returns and 
takeover premiums. Higher target returns are not obtained through wealth transfers 
from bidders but result from higher expected net value creation when deals are 
completed in a high-protection environment.  
 
The positive wealth effect of takeover law is primarily driven by the mandatory bid 
rule and the ownership disclosure rule. They increase the total gain enjoyed by the 
combined firm, thus confirming the theoretically predicted positive effect of the 
mandatory bid rule. Disclosure of ownership stakes positively affects announcement 
returns, which supports the bargaining power argument (Schouten and Siems, 2010; 
Armour et al., 2007), but does not seem to increase premiums, contrary to the view 
that bidders under tight disclosure rules need to win target shareholders’ support by 
offering higher premiums (Burkart, 1995, 1999; Bebchuk, 1982). Ownership 
disclosure facilitates competition among bidders, which in turn is anticipated by 
bidders who increase their stake in the target prior to the bid. There is some evidence 
that the fair price rule and the squeeze-out rights rule may reduce the total wealth of 
the combined companies. 
 
Our findings shed light on the importance of takeover regulation and provide 
practical implications for takeover policy around the world. For example, the 
management neutrality rule, which was controversially discussed in the legislative 
process that led to the EU takeover directive, shortens the time to successful 
completion of a takeover. This apparent improvement in transactional efficiency 
does not affect the combined wealth gains or the distribution of gains between targets 
and bidders. A possible reason for this ambiguous result might be found in a 
differential impact of management neutrality on firms with concentrated and 
dispersed ownership (Georgen et al., 2005). Management neutrality may also affect 
the occurrence of takeovers. Since an estimation of takeover frequency is beyond the 
scope of this paper, future research may complete the picture and investigate whether 
a stricter takeover law discourages bids and whether this reduces the overall 
beneficial effect of takeover regulation that we find. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Age Age is the number of years on the day of the announcement since the firm was
first covered by the stock exchange in a given country. Source: Datastream and 
Worldscope.  
CARs Bidder and target CARs are the cumulative abnormal announcement returns 
(CARs) of the bidding and target firms, calculated as the CARs over the event
window of [-2, +2] days around the takeover announcement, where day 0 is the 
announcement date. Combined CARs are calculated as target CAR plus bidder
CAR, weighted by their respective currency-adjusted market capitalization two 
days before the announcement. Target, bidder, and combined CARs are presented 
in percentage points to obtain reasonably scaled coefficients in our models.
Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model, where the market index
is a major local index. Parameters of the market model are estimated over the
period of 260 to 43 trading days prior to the takeover announcement. Penny stocks
whose price is below one main unit of local currency for more than 25 percent of 
all price observations are excluded, as are stocks with fewer than 30 return
observations. Source: Datastream. 
CAR run-up Stock price run-up is calculated as the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the
target firm over the window [-42, -3] prior to the takeover announcement, where 
day 0 is the announcement date and days are measured in trading days relative to
the announcement date. This variable is not scaled. See CARs for estimation 
details. 
Cash flow Cash flow ratio is calculated as the cash flow from operations over the total assets
at the end of fiscal year before the takeover announcement. Source: SDC,
Datastream, Worldscope.  
Cash-only 
Transaction  
This dummy variable takes a value of one if the takeover is fully paid in cash, and 
is zero otherwise. Source: Thomson Financial, LexisNexis, and Financial Times.
Challenged deal This dummy takes the value of one if the bidder’s takeover attempt was challenged 
by another bidder. Source: SDC. 
 
Days to 
completion 
The number of days between the announcement date of the takeover and the date
of its successful completion. Source: SDC. 
Deal value Deal value is measured as the natural logarithm of the transaction value disclosed
in SDC in millions of US dollars. 
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Diversification This dummy variable takes a value of one if the target and the acquirer operate in
different industries (the primary 2-digit SIC codes are different), and is zero 
otherwise. Source: Thomson Financial, LexisNexis, Financial Times and 
Worldscope. 
Distressed  This dummy variable equals one if net income of the target firm is zero or negative
in the year preceding the announcement of the deal, and is zero otherwise. Source: 
SDC, Datastream, Worldscope. 
Hostile Hostile is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the target management
reacts negatively to the initial takeover offer but the bidder persists with the
takeover. Source: Thomson Financial, LexisNexis, and Financial Times. 
Leverage Leverage is calculated as the ratio of total debt (long-term and short-term) to total 
assets in the fiscal year prior to the takeover announcement. Source: SDC,
Datastream, Worldscope.  
Successful 
takeover 
This dummy variable takes a value of one if the deal was completed successfully
at the end of the sample period at 31 December 2010. It is taken directly from 
SDC Platinum data; for 28 transactions with missing information about
completion, we identify their outcome through internet and news database search.
Source: SDC. 
Takeover Law 
Index 
The takeover law index measures the quality of takeover law in a given country.
It is the sum of six components as defined in Table 2: (1) ownership disclosure, 
(2) mandatory bid, (3) fair price for the minority shareholders, (4) squeeze-out 
rights, (5) sell-out rights, and (6) management neutrality, where the squeeze-out 
rule is negatively coded. The index ranges from minus one to five. A higher value
indicates a stricter takeover law, that is, a takeover law more favorable to target
shareholders. Source: Countries' Takeover Law and Regulation, Companies Law,
Securities Laws, and Stock Exchange Regulation; own construction. 
Takeover 
Premium 
The takeover premium is calculated as the ratio of the price paid per share to the 
target’s closing stock price one day prior to the original announcement date, minus 
one, expressed as a percentage: (offer price / share price at t–1 – 1) × 100. Source: 
Thomson Financial, LexisNexis, Financial Times, and Datastream. 
Tobin's Q Tobin's Q is calculated as the market value of the total assets divided by the book
value of the total assets, where the market value of the total assets is equal to the
market value of equity plus the book value of total debt. The market value of 
equity is the value two months prior to the takeover announcement, book value of
total assets and total debt are the values at the fiscal year end prior to the takeover
announcement. Source: SDC, Datastream, Worldscope. 
Toehold Toehold is the percentage of the target shares that the bidder owns in the target
firms prior to the takeover announcement. Source: Thomson Financial, 
LexisNexis, and Financial Times. 
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Appendix B: Sources of the Takeover Law Index for European Countries, 1986–
2010 
Country  Sources 
Austria   Companies Act 1965; Stock Exchange Act of 1989; Takeover Law 1998; Stock 
Exchange Act of 1989 as amended on June 26, 2006; Takeover Law 2006. Current 
regulator: Vienna Stock Exchange, Austrian Financial Market Authority, Takeover 
Commission. 
Belgium   The Law of 2 March 1989; Takeover Decree 1989; Companies Act 1995; Takeover 
Act 2007; Takeover Decree 2007; Transparency Law 2007. Current regulator: The 
Belgian Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission (CBFA). 
Czech 
Republic   
Civil Code 1963; Commercial Code 1991; Commercial Code 1996; Commercial 
Code 2000; Capital Market Act 2004; Takeover Law 2008. Current regulator: The 
Czech National Bank (CNB). 
Denmark   Companies Act 1985; Code of Ethics 1987; Securities Trading Act 1995; Securities 
Trading Act 1999; Order on Takeover Bids 2005; Takeover Act 2006; Companies 
Act 2006; Securities Trading Act 2008; Companies Act 2009. Current regulator: the 
Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA). 
Finland   Companies Act 1978; Securities Market Act 1989; Securities Market Act 1993; 
Companies Act 1997; Securities Market Act 1999; Securities Market Act 2006; 
Companies Act 2006. Current regulator: Finnish Financial Supervision Authority 
(FSA). 
France   Act on Commercial Companies 1966; SEC Decision 1981, Act related to Stock 
Companies Interests 1985; Act on Commercial Companies 1985; Act on Savings 
1987; Financial Market Act 1989; Stock Exchange Order on Takeover Bids 1992; 
Act on Commercial Companies 2000; Commercial Code 2000; Takeover Act 2006; 
Order of AMF 2006. Current regulator: Authority of Financial markets (AMF). 
Germany   Companies Act 1965; Securities Trading Act 1994; Takeover Code 1995; Takeover 
Act 2001; Takeover Offer Regulation 2001; Takeover Act 2006; Transparency 
Directive Implementation Act 2007. Current Regulator: Federal Financial 
Supervisory Authority (BaFin). 
Greece   Companies Act 1920; Decree on Information Disclosure 1992; Stock Exchange 
Decision 2000; Takeover Decision 2002; Takeover Act 2006; Transparency Law 
2007. Current Regulator: The Hellenic Capital Markets Commission (CMC). 
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Ireland Companies Act 1963; the UK takeover law index for the period 1986-1996; 
Companies Act 1990; Takeover Act 1997; Takeover Regulations 2006; 
Transparency Regulation 2007; Takeover Rules 2007; Transparency Rules 2009. 
Current regulator: The Irish Takeover Panel. 
Italy   Securities Market Law 1974; Public Offer Regulation 1992; Financial Act 1998; 
Amendment of Consolidated Financial Act 2007. Current regulator: National 
Commission for Companies and Stock Exchange (CONSOB). 
Luxembourg Companies Act 1915; Companies Act 1987; Law on Information Disclosure in a 
Listed Company 1992; Takeover Act 2006; Transparency law 2008. Current 
regulator: Luxembourg Financial Services Authority (CSSF). 
Netherlands  Civil Code Book 2 1958; Amendment of regulating the transfer of shares in Civil 
Code Book 2 1988-1989; Introducing buy-out minority interests in Civil Code Book 
2 1984-1985; Disclosure Act 1992; Disclosure Act 1996; Disclosure Act 2006; 
Financial Supervision Act 2006; Takeover Act 2007. Current regulator: The 
Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM). 
Portugal Commercial Code 1986; Securities Market Code 1991; Securities Market Code 1995; 
Securities Market Code 1999; Securities Market Code 2006. Current regulator: 
Portuguese Securities Market Commission (CMVM). 
Spain   Takeover Decree 1980; Securities Market Act 1988; Act on Public Bid 1991; 
Securities Market Act 2007; Takeover Decree 2007, Transparency Act 2007. Current 
regulator: National Securities Market Commission (CNMV). 
Sweden   NBK Recommendations 1971; Act on Acquisitions 1982; Securities Market Act 
1985; Securities Council Statement 1986; Financial Instruments Trading Act 1991; 
NBK Recommendations 1994; NBK Recommendations 1999, NBK Rules 2003; 
Companies Act 2005; Takeover Rules 2006; Takeover Act 2006. Current regulator: 
The Swedish Industry and Commerce Stock Exchange Committee (NBK), the 
Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA). 
United 
Kingdom   
Companies Act 1985; Takeover Code 1985; Companies Act 1989; Takeover Code 
2006, Companies Act 2006. Current regulator: The UK Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers (the Takeover Panel). 
54 
 
 
Appendix C: Correlation matrix  
The coefficients shown are Pearson correlation coefficients for pairwise complete observations. Some coefficients have been omitted for brevity. The full table is 
available from the authors. Significance levels: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
 
Combined 
CAR 
Bidder 
CAR 
Target  
CAR 
Takeover 
premium 
Days to 
completion
Takeover 
index 
Ownership 
disclosure 
Mandatory 
bid 
Fair price 
for minority
Squeeze-
out right 
Sellout 
rights 
Manage- 
ment  
neutrality 
Combined CAR -  0.80*** 0.37*** 0.15*** 0.00 0.00  -0.02  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Bidder CAR 0.80*** -  0.10*** 0.01  0.03 -0.06** -0.08*** -0.01  -0.01  -0.03  -0.03  -0.10*** 
Target CAR 0.37*** 0.10*** -  0.51*** -0.02  0.07** 0.09*** 0.03  0.04  0.06** 0.04  0.11*** 
Takeover premium 0.15*** 0.01  0.51*** -  -0.08*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.07** 0.09*** 0.16*** 
Days to completion 0.00  0.03  -0.02  -0.08*** - -0.08*** -0.13*** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.02  
Challenged deal 0.03  -0.03  0.04  0.22*** 0.01 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.07** 0.09*** 0.04  0.04  0.08*** 
Deal value (log) 0.09*** -0.02  0.01  0.01  0.02 -0.09*** -0.05* -0.11*** -0.06** -0.06** -0.09*** -0.04  
Toehold -0.03  0.05* -0.11*** -0.07** 0.05 -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.07** -0.10*** -0.12*** -0.08*** 
Hostile bid 0.05* -0.07** 0.09*** 0.10*** -0.01 0.09*** 0.07** 0.06** 0.04  0.06** 0.08*** 0.12*** 
Cash-only transaction 0.03  0.11*** 0.05* 0.01  -0.02 -0.15*** -0.19*** -0.09*** -0.05* -0.09*** -0.13*** -0.17*** 
Cross-border transaction 0.01  0.05* 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.01 -0.17*** -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.14*** -0.16*** 
Diversification -0.06** -0.02  0.02  -0.03  -0.01 0.05* 0.06** 0.05* 0.04  0.08*** 0.07** 0.06** 
(T) CAR run-up -0.03  0.00  0.01  0.17*** 0.00 0.07** 0.08*** 0.06** 0.06** 0.04  0.04  0.07** 
(T) Age 0.07** 0.01  0.05* 0.02  0.03 0.13*** 0.21*** 0.13*** 0.06** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 
(T) Total assets 0.12*** 0.06* -0.04  -0.04  0.07*** -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.17*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.16*** -0.11*** 
(T) Tobin's Q -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.09*** 0.03 -0.11*** -0.22*** -0.15*** -0.06** -0.33*** -0.28*** -0.06** 
(T) Leverage 0.05* 0.07*** -0.05* -0.01  0.01 -0.03  -0.04  -0.03  0.00  -0.05* -0.05* -0.04  
(T) Cash flow 0.12*** 0.05* 0.05* 0.02  0.01 0.04  0.05* 0.01  0.01  0.05* 0.04  0.07** 
(T) Distressed -0.11*** -0.06** -0.03  0.01  0.03 0.03  0.05* 0.06** 0.01  0.05  0.04  -0.01  
(A) Age 0.03  0.06** 0.06** 0.05* -0.02 0.07** 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.05* 0.13*** 0.09*** 0.07** 
(A) Total assets -0.03  0.09*** 0.05* 0.02  0.05 -0.18*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.10*** -0.07** -0.12*** -0.17*** 
(A) Cash flow 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.14*** 0.06* -0.01 0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.01  
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Notes 
 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 
2004 on Takeover Bids, O.J. 2004 L 142/12. Member states were required to 
transpose relevant provisions into local law by May 2006. 
 
2 In the context of this paper, state antitakeover regulation is found to be associated 
with firm value and operating performance (Giroud and Mueller, 2010; Daines, 
2001; Jahera and Pugh, 1991; Karpoff and Malatesta, 1989, 1995; Linn and 
McConnell, 1983), takeover premiums (Sokolyk, 2011; Comment and Schwert, 
1995), announcement returns when a firm is planning to adopt or repeal an 
antitakeover provision at the firm level such as supermajority provisions or classified 
boards (Cuñat et al., 2012; Faleye, 2007; DeAngelo and Rice, 1983; Linn and 
McConnell, 1983), and shareholder wealth in defeated takeover bids (Ryngaert and 
Scholten, 2010). 
 
3 He uses the EU directive as an external shock to test the hypothesis that bidders 
make worse acquisitions as a result of entrenchment of the bidder’s management 
caused by the directive. Rather than testing this indirect effect on takeover efficiency, 
we test the direct effect of takeover law in the target’s country on bidder and target 
returns. 
 
4 Another way to measure the efficiency of takeover regulation is to examine whether 
strict takeover law curbs the incentive of bidders to launch takeover bids or reduces 
the frequency of value-creation deals. However, it is difficult to examine these effects 
in practice. As these questions are beyond the scope of our study, we will focus on 
the impact of takeover law on shareholder wealth to examine the efficiency of 
takeover law. 
 
5 State anti-takeover regulation is different in this context due to the history of the 
US corporate governance system and the large proportion of hostile transactions. 
 
6 For example, the Takeover Code in the UK includes 271 pages and numerous 
provisions within 38 main takeover rules in 2006, while the Takeover Act in 
Germany consists of 8 main takeover articles in 2006. 
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7 Key provisions promulgated by the directive are the mandatory bid rule (Article 
5.1), equitable price (Article 5.4), disclosure (Article 8.2 and Article 10.1), the 
obligations of the target board (Article 9.2), breakthrough rule (Article 11), Squeeze-
out rule (Article 15) and sell-out rights (Article 16). Among these key provisions, 
board neutrality and the break-through rule are the most controversial provisions 
where Article 12 allows member states to adopt them as optional arrangements. 
Whereas 19 EU member states have implemented the board neutrality rule (Article 
9) of the directive, only three member states have adopted the breakthrough rule 
(Article 11). The breakthrough rule allows transfer restrictions become void during 
a takeover bid. It provides rights to the bidder to void voting restrictions and limit 
multiple-vote securities. According to the Application of Directive 2004/25/EC on 
takeover bids, only three countries - Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia - had adopted the 
breakthrough rule as an optional arrangement for their companies by June 2012. Due 
to the limited adoption of the breakthrough rule in Europe, we exclude it in the 
construction of our takeover law index. 
 
8 For example, EU decisions gradually eliminated the differences in national 
legislation and harmonized the regulation of ownership disclosure in European 
countries, particularly Directive 88/627/EEC, Directive 2001/34/EC and Directive 
2004/109/EC. 
 
9 Nenova (2003) examines the control block premium by considering the impact of 
takeover regulation, where takeover regulation is proxied by three variables in 1997. 
 
10 The governance index developed by Martynova and Renneboog (2011a) contains 
some of the provisions studied in this paper but encompasses a much broader range 
of governance variables that are not relevant in the takeover process. 
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11 In the UK, takeovers and mergers are self-regulated by the City Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers issued by the Takeover Panel. The Panel’s statutory 
functions are set out in and under Chapter 1 of Part 28 (sections 942 to 965) of the 
Companies Act 2006. Although the City Code has changed in the past three decades, 
these changes are relatively minor as far as our UK takeover law index is concerned. 
For example, the threshold to trigger the mandatory bid rule has been 30% since the 
first edition of the City Code was published in April 1985. The threshold to trigger 
the mandatory bid rule for any person who holds no less than 30% but not more than 
50% when acquiring more voting rights was reduced from 2% of the voting rights in 
1985 to 1% in 1993. To enable a systematic comparison across countries, we focus 
on the threshold that first triggers the mandatory bid rule. Therefore, the change does 
not affect the score of the UK index. The protection of minority shareholders in 
Ireland before 1997 is similar to the UK because takeovers in Ireland are regulated 
by the UK City Code before 1997. 
 
12 For example, based on the experience with the takeover of Mannesmann AG by 
Vodafone plc, the Germany introduced its first takeover law in 2002.  
 
13 During the collection of takeover law provisions, we noticed that there were many 
letters from the target firms to the regulators which require a particular protection to 
the target shareholders. 
 
14 Studies using share price information to measure the wealth effect of takeovers 
include Ang and Ismail (2015), Cuñat et al. (2012), Sokolyk (2011), Giroud and 
Mueller (2010), Schouten and Siems (2010), Bris and Cabolis (2008), Martynova 
and Renneboog (2008b), Armour et al. (2007), Faleye (2007), Faccio et al. (2006), 
Rossi and Volpin (2004), Daines (2001), Comment and Schwert (1995). 
 
15 See, for example, Cuñat et al. (2012), Sokolyk (2011), Giroud and Mueller (2010), 
Cable and Holland (1999). 
 
16 Faccio et al. (2006) find that acquirers in 17 European countries earn −0.38 
percent during the period 1996–2001, but this result is not significantly different 
from zero. 
 
17 We find that robust standard errors are more conservative in our models than 
standard errors clustered by country. 
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18 Deal features that have explained takeover returns in previous studies are 
controlled for in our analysis, namely payment method, hostile deals, diversifying 
takeovers, toehold and cross-border transactions (Ang and Ismail, 2015; Betton et 
al., 2009; Bauguess et al., 2009; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008b; Faccio et al., 
2006; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Franks and Mayer, 1996; Jensen and Ruback, 1983). 
 
19 We include Tobin’s Q, cash flow, leverage and financial distress in our regression 
analysis (Alexandridis et al., 2013; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Faccio et al., 2006; Dong 
et al., 2006; Moeller et al., 2004; Servaes, 1991; Morck et al., 1990; Lang et al., 
1989). Target pre-announcement run-up stock price, proxied by the target run-up 
CARs is also controlled in our regressions because it could reflect public information 
about the takeover, an increase in the target’s stand-alone value, or illegal insider 
trading (King, 2009; Schwert, 1996; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989). 
 
20 Arguably, firm-specific compliance may have some additional explanatory power 
over country specific legal provisions. Recently, Enriques et al. (2014) argue that 
takeover regulation should support an effective choice to allow individual companies 
to decide their takeover regime at the company level. However, it is beyond the scope 
of this study due to the limited availability of firm-level data. 
 
21 The statistics of the takeover law provisions, not reported, show that 44% of the 
EU countries have the ownership disclosure provision as their first single takeover 
regulation. If we consider a joint implementation of ownership disclosure as their 
first takeover rule, this number rises to 88%. Furthermore, we find that, though only 
6% of the EU countries implement mandatory bid rule provision as their first single 
takeover rule, the joint implementation of mandatory bid rule is 44%.  
 
22 Results are available from the authors upon request. 
 
23 We also test share prices four weeks before the announcement as an alternative 
denominator. Results are qualitatively similar, but weaker, as one would expect if 
the announcement effect is concentrated in a narrow window around the 
announcement day. 
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24Another transmission mechanism from changes in takeover laws to shareholder 
wealth may be the type of consideration, because the method of payment in M&A 
transactions interacts strongly with the internal and external corporate governance 
context of a firm (Faccio and Masulis, 2005) and affects the announcement returns 
and premiums paid in these transactions as shown in this paper (see also Moeller et 
al, 2004). We test the effect of takeover law on whether the consideration in a 
transaction consists entirely of cash but find no effect in our sample.  
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